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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0067: APT37

APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. APT37 has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.[1][2][3]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

EnterpriseG0067GroupObject v2.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0067: APT37 describes [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, No...

Executive priority

G0067: APT37 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0067: APT37 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0067: APT37 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT37

APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. APT37 has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.[1][2][3]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

29 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1120Peripheral Device Discovery

APT37 has a Bluetooth device harvester, which uses Windows Bluetooth APIs to find information on connected Bluetooth devices. [4]

EnterpriseT1059.006PythonSub-technique

APT37 has used Python scripts to execute payloads.CitationVolexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

APT37 has downloaded second stage malware from compromised websites.[1][4][5]CitationVolexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

APT37 uses HTTPS to conceal C2 communications.[3]

EnterpriseT1027.003SteganographySub-technique

APT37 uses steganography to send images to users that are embedded with shellcode.[3][4]

EnterpriseT1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique

APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

APT37 collects the computer name, the BIOS model, and execution path.[3]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

APT37 has sent spearphishing attachments attempting to get a user to open them.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.001Invalid Code SignatureSub-technique

APT37 has signed its malware with an invalid digital certificates listed as “Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited.”[2]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

APT37 has a function in the initial dropper to bypass Windows UAC in order to execute the next payload with higher privileges.[4]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

APT37 identifies the victim username.[3]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

APT37 has used a credential stealer known as ZUMKONG that can harvest usernames and passwords stored in browsers.[1]

EnterpriseT1529System Shutdown/Reboot

APT37 has used malware that will issue the command shutdown /r /t 1 to reboot a system after wiping its MBR.[3]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

APT37 has collected data from victims' local systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeSub-technique

APT37 has used Windows DDE for execution of commands and a malicious VBS.[2]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.[3]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

APT37 has used exploits for Flash Player (CVE-2016-4117, CVE-2018-4878), Word (CVE-2017-0199), Internet Explorer (CVE-2020-1380 and CVE-2020-26411), and Microsoft Edge (CVE-2021-26411) for execution.[2][1][3][5]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

APT37 injects its malware variant, ROKRAT, into the cmd.exe process.[3]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

APT37 obfuscates strings and payloads.[3][4]CitationVolexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

APT37 has used strategic web compromises, particularly of South Korean websites, to distribute malware. The group has also used torrent file-sharing sites to more indiscriminately disseminate malware to victims. As part of their compromises, the group has used a Javascript based profiler called RICECURRY to profile a victim's web browser and deliver malicious code accordingly.[2][1][5]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

APT37's Freenki malware lists running processes using the Microsoft Windows API.[3]

EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

APT37 has used Ruby scripts to execute payloads.CitationVolexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

APT37 has used the command-line interface.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

APT37 delivers malware using spearphishing emails with malicious HWP attachments.[1][3][4]

EnterpriseT1123Audio Capture

APT37 has used an audio capturing utility known as SOUNDWAVE that captures microphone input.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

APT37 executes shellcode and a VBA script to decode Base64 strings.[3]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

APT37 has created scheduled tasks to run malicious scripts on a compromised host.CitationVolexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021

EnterpriseT1561.002Disk Structure WipeSub-technique

APT37 has access to destructive malware that is capable of overwriting a machine's Master Boot Record (MBR).[1][3]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S0247: NavRAT

NavRAT is a remote access tool designed to upload, download, and execute files. It has been observed in attacks targeting South Korea. [1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0213: DOGCALL

DOGCALL is a backdoor used by APT37 that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1120: Peripheral Device DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.006: PythonEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0657: BLUELIGHTEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0212: CORALDECKEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.003: SteganographyEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0215: KARAEEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0218: SLOWDRIFTEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102.002: Bidirectional CommunicationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.001: Invalid Code SignatureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1548.002: Bypass User Account ControlEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555.003: Credentials from Web BrowsersEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1529: System Shutdown/RebootEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0240: ROKRATEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1559.002: Dynamic Data ExchangeEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0217: SHUTTERSPEEDEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1203: Exploitation for Client ExecutionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
03d46712f339500c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundle03d46712f339…
19.12.0Older bundle2b373c2810d3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye APT37 Feb 2018

    FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016

    Raiu, C., and Ivanov, A. (2016, June 17). Operation Daybreak. Retrieved February 15, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Talos Group123

    Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Securelist ScarCruft May 2019

    GReAT. (2019, May 13). ScarCruft continues to evolve, introduces Bluetooth harvester. Retrieved June 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021

    Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    APT37

    (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)

  7. [7]
    CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021

    CrowdStrike. (2021, September 30). Adversary Profile - Ricochet Chollima. Retrieved September 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Group123

    (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)

  9. [9]
    InkySquid

    (Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)

  10. [10]
    Reaper

    (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)

  11. [11]
    Ricochet Chollima

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Richochet Chollima September 2021)

  12. [12]
    ScarCruft

    (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft May 2019)

  13. [13]
    TEMP.Reaper

    (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)

  14. [14]
    mitre-attackG0067
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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