S1086: Snip3
MITRE ATT&CK S1086: Snip3 Malware details for Windows, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
S1086: Snip3 describes [Snip3](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1086) is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including [AsyncRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1087), [Revenge RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0379), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331), and [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198).(Citation: Morphisec Snip3 May 2021)(Citation: Telefonica Snip3 December 2021)
Executive priority
S1086: Snip3 is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1086: Snip3 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1086: Snip3 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Snip3
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | This object uses Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information. |
| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | This object uses Web Service. |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | This object uses Visual Basic. |
| Enterprise | T1055.012 | Process HollowingSub-technique | This object uses Process Hollowing. |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | This object uses Obfuscated Files or Information. |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | This object uses Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder. |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | This object uses Malicious File. |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | This object uses System Information Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | This object uses Malicious Link. |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | This object uses Spearphishing Attachment. |
| Enterprise | T1497.003 | Time Based ChecksSub-technique | This object uses Time Based Checks. |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | This object uses Windows Management Instrumentation. |
| Enterprise | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels | This object uses Multi-Stage Channels. |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | This object uses Ingress Tool Transfer. |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | This object uses Spearphishing Link. |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | This object uses Drive-by Compromise. |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | This object uses System Checks. |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | This object uses Hidden Window. |
| Enterprise | T1027.001 | Binary PaddingSub-technique | This object uses Binary Padding. |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | This object uses PowerShell. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1018: TA2541
TA2541 is a cybercriminal group that has been targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries since at least 2017. TA2541 campaigns are typically high volume and involve the use of commodity remote access tools obfuscated by crypters and themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 8844fd55311e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 8844fd55311e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Morphisec Snip3 May 2021
Lorber, N. (2021, May 7). Revealing the Snip3 Crypter, a Highly Evasive RAT Loader. Retrieved September 13, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]Telefonica Snip3 December 2021
Jornet, A. (2021, December 23). Snip3, an investigation into malware. Retrieved September 19, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS1086Open source URL
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