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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1086: Snip3

Snip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1086MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1086: Snip3 describes [Snip3](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1086) is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including [AsyncRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1087), [Revenge RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0379), [Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331), and [NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198).(Citation: Morphisec Snip3 May 2021)(Citation: Telefonica Snip3 December 2021)

Executive priority

S1086: Snip3 is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1086: Snip3 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1086: Snip3 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Snip3

Snip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

20 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Snip3 can decode its second-stage PowerShell script prior to execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1102Web Service

Snip3 can download additional payloads from web services including Pastebin and top4top.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

Snip3 can use visual basic scripts for first-stage execution.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1055.012Process HollowingSub-technique

Snip3 can use RunPE to execute malicious payloads within a hollowed Windows process.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Snip3 has the ability to obfuscate strings using XOR encryption.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Snip3 can create a VBS file in startup to persist after system restarts.[2]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Snip3 can gain execution through the download of visual basic files.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Snip3 has the ability to query `Win32_ComputerSystem` for system information. [1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Snip3 has been executed through luring victims into clicking malicious links.[2]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Snip3 has been delivered to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

Snip3 can execute `WScript.Sleep` to delay execution of its second stage.[1]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Snip3 can query the WMI class `Win32_ComputerSystem` to gather information.[1]

EnterpriseT1104Multi-Stage Channels

Snip3 can download and execute additional payloads and modules over separate communication channels.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Snip3 can download additional payloads to compromised systems.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Snip3 has been delivered to victims through e-mail links to malicious files.[2]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Snip3 has been delivered to targets via downloads from malicious domains.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Snip3 has the ability to detect Windows Sandbox, VMWare, or VirtualBox by querying `Win32_ComputerSystem` to extract the `Manufacturer` string.[1]

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

Snip3 can execute PowerShell scripts in a hidden window.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.001Binary PaddingSub-technique

Snip3 can obfuscate strings using junk Chinese characters.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Snip3 can use a PowerShell script for second-stage execution.[1][2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1018: TA2541

TA2541 is a cybercriminal group that has been targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries since at least 2017. TA2541 campaigns are typically high volume and involve the use of commodity remote access tools obfuscated by crypters and themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102: Web ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.012: Process HollowingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.003: Time Based ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1104: Multi-Stage ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564.003: Hidden WindowEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.001: Binary PaddingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · GroupG1018: TA2541Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
8844fd55311e110b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundle8844fd55311e…
19.21.0Older bundle8844fd55311e…
19.11.0Older bundle8844fd55311e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Morphisec Snip3 May 2021

    Lorber, N. (2021, May 7). Revealing the Snip3 Crypter, a Highly Evasive RAT Loader. Retrieved September 13, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Telefonica Snip3 December 2021

    Jornet, A. (2021, December 23). Snip3, an investigation into malware. Retrieved September 19, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS1086
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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