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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G1012: CURIUM

CURIUM is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East.[1] CURIUM has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note CURIUM has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.[2]

EnterpriseG1012GroupObject v3.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G1012: CURIUM describes [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East.(Citation: Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019) [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1...

Executive priority

G1012: CURIUM is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G1012: CURIUM by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G1012: CURIUM appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

CURIUM

CURIUM is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East.[1] CURIUM has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note CURIUM has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

19 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique

CURIUM has used social media to deliver malicious files to victims.[2]

EnterpriseT1505.003Web ShellSub-technique

CURIUM has been linked to web shells following likely server compromise as an initial access vector into victim networks.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

CURIUM has lured users into opening malicious files delivered via social media.[2]

EnterpriseT1584.006Web ServicesSub-technique

CURIUM has compromised legitimate websites to enable strategic website compromise attacks.[3]

EnterpriseT1583.003Virtual Private ServerSub-technique

CURIUM created virtual private server instances to facilitate use of malicious domains and other items.[3]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

CURIUM deploys information gathering tools focused on capturing IP configuration, running application, system information, and network connectivity information.[1]

EnterpriseT1608.004Drive-by TargetSub-technique

CURIUM used strategic website compromise to fingerprint then target victims.[3]

EnterpriseT1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolSub-technique

CURIUM has used SMTPS to exfiltrate collected data from victims.[3]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

CURIUM has exfiltrated data from a compromised machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1585.001Social Media AccountsSub-technique

CURIUM has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to establish relationships with victims, often posing as an attractive woman.[2]

EnterpriseT1585.002Email AccountsSub-technique

CURIUM has created dedicated email accounts for use with tools such as IMAPLoader.[3]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

CURIUM deployed mechanisms to check system time information following strategic website compromise attacks.[3]

EnterpriseT1598.003Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

CURIUM used malicious links to adversary-controlled resources for credential harvesting.[3]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

CURIUM has used strategic website compromise to infect victims with malware such as IMAPLoader.[3]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

CURIUM has used phishing with malicious attachments for initial access to victim environments.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

CURIUM has leveraged PowerShell scripts for initial process execution and data gathering in victim environments.[1]

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

CURIUM created domains to facilitate strategic website compromise and credential capture activities.[3]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

CURIUM has used IMAP and SMTPS for exfiltration via tools such as IMAPLoader.[3]

EnterpriseT1583.004ServerSub-technique

CURIUM has created dedicated servers for command and control and exfiltration purposes.[3]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1566.003: Spearphishing via ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1505.003: Web ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1584.006: Web ServicesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.003: Virtual Private ServerEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1608.004: Drive-by TargetEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1048.002: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1585.001: Social Media AccountsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1585.002: Email AccountsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1598.003: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · MalwareS1152: IMAPLoaderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.001: DomainsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.004: ServerEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
3.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1a449c277b4d49f0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.23.0Current bundle1a449c277b4d…
19.13.0Older bundle3821fc6cc53c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Symantec Tortoiseshell 2019

    Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2019, September 18). Tortoiseshell Group Targets IT Providers in Saudi Arabia in Probable Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved May 20, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft Iranian Threat Actor Trends November 2021

    MSTIC. (2021, November 16). Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity – MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021. Retrieved January 12, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    PWC Yellow Liderc 2023

    PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Crimson Sandstorm

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  5. [5]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Proofpoint TA456 Defense Contractor July 2021

    Miller, J. et. al. (2021, July 28). I Knew You Were Trouble: TA456 Targets Defense Contractor with Alluring Social Media Persona. Retrieved March 11, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    TA456

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Proofpoint TA456 Defense Contractor July 2021)

  8. [8]
    Tortoise Shell

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  9. [9]
    Yellow Liderc

    (Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)

  10. [10]
    mitre-attackG1012
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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