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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0606: Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. Bad Rabbit has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. [1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0606MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0606: Bad Rabbit describes [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. [Bad Rabbit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0606) has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. (Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Dragos Apr 2019)

Executive priority

S0606: Bad Rabbit is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0606: Bad Rabbit by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0606: Bad Rabbit appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. Bad Rabbit has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. [1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

Bad Rabbit has encrypted files and disks using AES-128-CBC and RSA-2048.[1]

EnterpriseT1110.003Password SprayingSub-technique

Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file uses NTLM login credentials to brute force Windows machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1495Firmware Corruption

Bad Rabbit has used an executable that installs a modified bootloader to prevent normal boot-up.[1]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

Bad Rabbit drops a file named infpub.datinto the Windows directory and is executed through SCManager and rundll.exe.

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file creates a scheduled task to launch a malicious executable.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Bad Rabbit has masqueraded as a Flash Player installer through the executable file install_flash_player.exe.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Bad Rabbit spread through watering holes on popular sites by injecting JavaScript into the HTML body or a .js file.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

Bad Rabbit has used Mimikatz to harvest credentials from the victim's machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

Bad Rabbit has attempted to bypass UAC and gain elevated administrative privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Bad Rabbit can enumerate all running processes to compare hashes.[1]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

Bad Rabbit enumerates open SMB shares on internal victim networks.[2]

EnterpriseT1210Exploitation of Remote Services

Bad Rabbit used the EternalRomance SMB exploit to spread through victim networks.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Bad Rabbit has used rundll32 to launch a malicious DLL as C:Windowsinfpub.dat.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Bad Rabbit has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Bad Rabbit has used various Windows API calls.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0034: Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]

In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1110.003: Password SprayingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1495: Firmware CorruptionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1569.002: Service ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.001: LSASS MemoryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1548.002: Bypass User Account ControlEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1135: Network Share DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1210: Exploitation of Remote ServicesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · GroupG0034: Sandworm TeamEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7a9204e572f8f4e7...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.1Current bundle7a9204e572f8…
19.21.1Older bundle7a9204e572f8…
19.11.1Older bundle7a9204e572f8…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Secure List Bad Rabbit

    Mamedov, O. Sinitsyn, F. Ivanov, A.. (2017, October 24). Bad Rabbit ransomware. Retrieved January 28, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ESET Bad Rabbit

    M.Léveille, M-E.. (2017, October 24). Bad Rabbit: Not‑Petya is back with improved ransomware. Retrieved January 28, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Dragos Apr 2019

    Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0606
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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