S0451: LoudMiner

LoudMiner is a cryptocurrency miner which uses virtualization software to siphon system resources. The miner has been bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.[1]

EnterpriseS0451MalwareObject v1.4ModifiedApr 11, 2024, 01:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0451: LoudMiner describes [LoudMiner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0451) is a cryptocurrency miner which uses virtualization software to siphon system resources. The miner has been bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.(Citation: ESET LoudMiner June 2019)

Executive priority

S0451: LoudMiner is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0451: LoudMiner by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (macOS, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0451: LoudMiner appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

LoudMiner

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques18 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	LoudMiner used the `ps` command to monitor the running processes on the system.[1]
Enterprise	T1569.001	LaunchctlSub-technique	LoudMiner launched the QEMU services in the `/Library/LaunchDaemons/` folder using `launchctl`. It also uses `launchctl` to unload all Launch Daemons when updating to a newer version of LoudMiner.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.010	Command ObfuscationSub-technique	LoudMiner has obfuscated various scripts.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	LoudMiner has encrypted DMG files.[1]
Enterprise	T1564.001	Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique	LoudMiner has set the attributes of the VirtualBox directory and VBoxVmService parent directory to "hidden".[1]
Enterprise	T1059.004	Unix ShellSub-technique	LoudMiner used shell scripts to launch various services and to start/stop the QEMU virtualization.[1]
Enterprise	T1543.004	Launch DaemonSub-technique	LoudMiner adds plist files with the naming format `com.[random_name].plist` in the `/Library/LaunchDaemons` folder with the RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys set to `true`.[1]
Enterprise	T1496.001	Compute HijackingSub-technique	LoudMiner harvested system resources to mine cryptocurrency, using XMRig to mine Monero.[1]
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows ServiceSub-technique	LoudMiner can automatically launch a Linux virtual machine as a service at startup if the AutoStart option is enabled in the VBoxVmService configuration file.[1]
Enterprise	T1189	Drive-by Compromise	LoudMiner is typically bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.[1]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	LoudMiner used a script to gather the IP address of the infected machine before sending to the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	LoudMiner used SCP to update the miner from the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1569.002	Service ExecutionSub-technique	LoudMiner started the cryptomining virtual machine as a service on the infected machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	LoudMiner deleted installation files after completion.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	LoudMiner has monitored CPU usage.[1]
Enterprise	T1564.006	Run Virtual InstanceSub-technique	LoudMiner has used QEMU and VirtualBox to run a Tiny Core Linux virtual machine, which runs XMRig and makes connections to the C2 server for updates.[1]
Enterprise	T1218.007	MsiexecSub-technique	LoudMiner used an MSI installer to install the virtualization software.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	LoudMiner used a batch script to run the Linux virtual machine as a service.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.4
Created: May 18, 2020, 21:01 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 11, 2024, 01:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 6a344fcf38f8d2a5...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.4	Apr 11, 2024, 01:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`6a344fcf38f8…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.4	Apr 11, 2024, 01:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`6a344fcf38f8…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
ESET LoudMiner June 2019
Malik, M. (2019, June 20). LoudMiner: Cross-platform mining in cracked VST software. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0451
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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