G0070: Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012. [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0070: Dark Caracal describes [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070) is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012. (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)
Executive priority
G0070: Dark Caracal is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0070: Dark Caracal by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0070: Dark Caracal appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Dark Caracal has obfuscated strings in Bandook by base64 encoding, and then encrypting them.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | Dark Caracal has used macros in Word documents that would download a second stage if executed.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Dark Caracal's version of Bandook communicates with their server over a TCP port using HTTP payloads Base64 encoded and suffixed with the string “&&&”.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Dark Caracal makes their malware look like Flash Player, Office, or PDF documents in order to entice a user to click on it.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | Dark Caracal has used UPX to pack Bandook.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1218.001 | Compiled HTML FileSub-technique | Dark Caracal leveraged a compiled HTML file that contained a command to download and run an executable.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | Dark Caracal leveraged a watering hole to serve up malicious code.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Dark Caracal's version of Bandook adds a registry key to |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Dark Caracal collected file listings of all default Windows directories.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1566.003 | Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique | Dark Caracal spearphished victims via Facebook and Whatsapp.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Dark Caracal collected complete contents of the 'Pictures' folder from compromised Windows systems.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | Dark Caracal took screenshots using their Windows malware.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0182: FinFisher
FinFisher is a government-grade commercial surveillance spyware reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including Wingbird. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
S0235: CrossRAT
CrossRAT is a cross platform RAT.
S0234: Bandook
Bandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as "Operation Manul".[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.4 | Older bundle | ce539a0a8837… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.4 | Current bundle | e0c8406309fa… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.4 | Older bundle | 58ef4b46fa30… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018
Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Dark Caracal
(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)
- [3]mitre-attackG0070Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.