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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0066: Elderwood

Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. [1] The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. [2] [3]

EnterpriseG0066GroupObject v1.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0066: Elderwood describes [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. (Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012) The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)

Executive priority

G0066: Elderwood is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0066: Elderwood by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0066: Elderwood appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Elderwood

Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. [1] The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. [2] [3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

9 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Elderwood has encrypted documents and malicious executables.[2]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open attachments.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing a link to malicious content hosted on an uncommon Web server.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing malicious attachments.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open links.[2][3]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims by injecting malicious code into specific public Web pages visited by targets within a particular sector.[2][3][1]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

Elderwood has used exploitation of endpoint software, including Microsoft Internet Explorer Adobe Flash vulnerabilities, to gain execution. They have also used zero-day exploits.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

The Ritsol backdoor trojan used by Elderwood can download files onto a compromised host from a remote location.CitationSymantec Ristol May 2012

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Elderwood has packed malware payloads before delivery to victims.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
427c446ebfd81630...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundle427c446ebfd8…
19.11.3Older bundlec29c0eb3d8a9…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012

    Paganini, P. (2012, September 9). Elderwood project, who is behind Op. Aurora and ongoing attacks?. Retrieved February 13, 2018.

  2. [2]
    Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012

    O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    CSM Elderwood Sept 2012

    Clayton, M.. (2012, September 14). Stealing US business secrets: Experts ID two huge cyber 'gangs' in China. Retrieved February 15, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Beijing Group

    (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)

  5. [5]
    Elderwood

    (Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)

  6. [6]
    Elderwood Gang

    (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)

  7. [7]
    Sneaky Panda

    (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)

  8. [8]
    mitre-attackG0066
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.