S0482: Bundlore
Security context for executives and security teams
S0482: Bundlore describes [Bundlore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0482) is adware written for macOS that has been in use since at least 2015. Though categorized as adware, [Bundlore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0482) has many features associated with more traditional backdoors.(Citation: MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019)
Executive priority
S0482: Bundlore is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0482: Bundlore by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0482: Bundlore appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Bundlore
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Bundlore uses the |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1564 | Hide Artifacts | Bundlore uses the |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | |
| Enterprise | T1098.004 | SSH Authorized KeysSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.006 | PythonSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1543.001 | Launch AgentSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1056.002 | GUI Input CaptureSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1543.004 | Launch DaemonSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1176.001 | Browser ExtensionsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.002 | AppleScriptSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1222.002 | Linux and Mac PermissionsSub-technique | Bundlore changes the permissions of a payload using the command |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 9ef6855cb354… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 9ef6855cb354… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019
Sushko, O. (2019, April 17). macOS Bundlore: Mac Virus Bypassing macOS Security Features. Retrieved June 30, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]OSX.Bundlore
(Citation: MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019)
- [3]mitre-attackS0482Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
