G0077: Leafminer
Security context for executives and security teams
G0077: Leafminer describes [Leafminer](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0077) is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017. (Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)
Executive priority
G0077: Leafminer is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0077: Leafminer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0077: Leafminer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Leafminer
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS MemorySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1003.005 | Cached Domain CredentialsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1552.001 | Credentials In FilesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1003.004 | LSA SecretsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1055.013 | Process DoppelgängingSub-technique | Leafminer has used Process Doppelgänging to evade security software while deploying tools on compromised systems.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1110.003 | Password SprayingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1136.001 | Local AccountSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1114.002 | Remote Email CollectionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0349: LaZagne
S0002: Mimikatz
S0413: MailSniper
MailSniper is a penetration testing tool for searching through email in a Microsoft Exchange environment for specific terms (passwords, insider intel, network architecture information, etc.). It can be used by a non-administrative user to search their own email, or by an Exchange administrator to search the mailboxes of every user in a domain.[1]
S0029: PsExec
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.4 | Current bundle | 1b3e24c3a2b3… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.4 | Older bundle | 5fe929e5be0d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Symantec Leafminer July 2018
Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Dragos Raspite Aug 2018
Dragos, Inc. (2018, August 2). RASPITE. Retrieved November 26, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]Leafminer
(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)
- [4]Raspite
(Citation: Dragos Raspite Aug 2018)
- [5]mitre-attackG0077Open source URL
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