G0115: GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the REvil Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). GOLD SOUTHFIELD provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, GOLD SOUTHFIELD started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing data and further extorting the victim to pay for their data to not get publicly leaked.[1][2][3][4]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0115: GOLD SOUTHFIELD describes [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing d...
Executive priority
G0115: GOLD SOUTHFIELD is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0115: GOLD SOUTHFIELD by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0115: GOLD SOUTHFIELD appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the REvil Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). GOLD SOUTHFIELD provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, GOLD SOUTHFIELD started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing data and further extorting the victim to pay for their data to not get publicly leaked.[1][2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1199 | Trusted Relationship | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has breached Managed Service Providers (MSP's) to deliver malware to MSP customers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has exploited Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities for initial compromise.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the remote monitoring and management tool ConnectWise to obtain screen captures from victim's machines.CitationTetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Tools | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool "ConnectWise Control" to deploy REvil.CitationTetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1195.002 | Compromise Software Supply ChainSub-technique | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has distributed ransomware by backdooring software installers via a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR.[1][2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has executed base64 encoded PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts.CitationTetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used publicly-accessible RDP and remote management and monitoring (RMM) servers to gain access to victim machines.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has staged and executed PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts.CitationTetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1566 | Phishing | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has conducted malicious spam (malspam) campaigns to gain access to victim's machines.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0591: ConnectWise
ConnectWise is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used since at least 2016 by threat actors including MuddyWater and GOLD SOUTHFIELD to connect to and conduct lateral movement in target environments.[1][2]
S0496: REvil
REvil is a ransomware family that has been linked to the GOLD SOUTHFIELD group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. REvil, which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 8ecbc68ea45f… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 72f889d06ace… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Secureworks REvil September 2019
Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019
Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]Secureworks GOLD SOUTHFIELD
Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SOUTHFIELD. Retrieved October 6, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]CrowdStrike Evolution of Pinchy Spider July 2021
Meyers, Adam. (2021, July 6). The Evolution of PINCHY SPIDER from GandCrab to REvil. Retrieved March 28, 2023.
Open source URL - [5]Pinchy Spider
(Citation: CrowdStrike Evolution of Pinchy Spider July 2021)
- [6]mitre-attackG0115Open source URL
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