T1564.003: Hidden Window
Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.
Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.CitationAntiquated Mac Malware
On macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.
Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and Visual Basic to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.CitationPowerShell About 2019
The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.CitationCantoris Computing
In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.CitationHidden VNCCitationAnatomy of an hVNC Attack All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,CitationHidden VNC will be invisible to other desktops windows.
Adversaries may also leverage cmd.exeCitationCybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,CitationLOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred DepCitationSecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev to hide windows.
Security context for executives and security teams
Hidden Window is a stealth behavior where activity that would normally be visible to a user is deliberately kept out of sight. For leaders, the practical issue is not the window itself; it is that user-visible warning signs can be removed while scripts, remote access activity, or administrative-looking processes continue running. Because ATT&CK lists Linux, macOS, and Windows, coverage should be validated across endpoint types rather than treated as a Windows-only concern.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an endpoint visibility and execution-control issue. Hidden windows can reduce the chance that users notice suspicious activity, which increases dependence on SOC telemetry, managed detection, and incident response process maturity. Leadership should ask whether endpoint logging can show hidden or non-interactive execution, whether script and application-control policies are enforced, and whether exceptions for administrative tooling are documented for audit and incident review. The many ATT&CK relationships to groups and PlugX make this a useful detection-engineering validation case, but they do not by themselves prove exposure or active targeting.
Technical view
ATT&CK describes this sub-technique under Hide Artifacts and the stealth tactic. Validate monitoring for hidden PowerShell execution such as WindowStyle Hidden, suspicious script hosts including JScript and Visual Basic contexts, Registry changes that alter console window positioning, macOS plist use of apple.awt.UIElement for Java applications, and Windows hidden desktop behavior associated with CreateDesktop() or hidden VNC-style activity. Also review command-line parent/child relationships involving cmd.exe and LOLBins such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe when windows are suppressed. Official ATT&CK detection text is not provided, but the relationship to DET0128 indicates a detection strategy exists for Hidden Windows; teams should map that strategy to local telemetry and testable analytics.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint process creation events with command line, parent process, user, integrity/session context, and working directory
- PowerShell execution logs and command-line parameters, including hidden window style indicators
- Script host execution telemetry for PowerShell, JScript, and Visual Basic-related activity
- Windows Registry modification events for console or application window-position settings
- macOS application plist contents and file modification telemetry, especially apple.awt.UIElement usage
Detection direction
- Do not rely on user reports or visible pop-ups; validate machine telemetry that records non-interactive or hidden execution.
- Tune detections around suspicious combinations: hidden-window flags plus script execution, unusual parent-child chains, off-screen console Registry changes, or hidden desktop behavior.
- Separate legitimate administrative suppression from suspicious use by baselining approved software deployment, endpoint management, and automation tools.
- Review macOS coverage separately; plist-based Dock/icon hiding may not appear in the same telemetry pipeline as Windows process analytics.
- Use relationship context from known groups and PlugX as threat-intelligence enrichment, not as proof of local compromise.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with M1033 Limit Software Installation: restrict unauthorized software and reduce the ability to introduce tools that hide user-facing activity.
- Apply M1038 Execution Prevention: enforce application control and script-blocking policies appropriate to the environment.
- Harden and monitor administrative scripting paths, especially PowerShell and Windows script hosts, while preserving documented business automation use cases.
- Review least-privilege and endpoint-management controls so ordinary users cannot install or run unapproved remote access or LOLBin-abusing workflows.
- Maintain audit evidence for approved exceptions, policy enforcement, and detection tests so SOC and compliance teams can demonstrate coverage.
Additional notes and limits
This object is T1564.003 Hidden Window, a sub-technique of T1564 Hide Artifacts, with platforms listed as Linux, macOS, and Windows. ATT&CK relationships include mitigation by M1033 and M1038, detection by DET0128, revocation replacement of T1143, and use by multiple groups and PlugX. Those relationships support prioritization and enrichment, but local risk depends on endpoint mix, scripting exposure, administrative practices, and telemetry quality.
The supplied ATT&CK object does not include official detection text, and relationship descriptions are partial for several related objects. This take therefore provides validation direction rather than guaranteed analytics or coverage claims. It does not claim active exploitation, attribution against any organization, or confirmed customer exposure.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Hidden Window
Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.
Adversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.CitationAntiquated Mac Malware
On macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.
Similarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and Visual Basic to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden.CitationPowerShell About 2019
The Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.CitationCantoris Computing
In addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding explorer.exe process.CitationHidden VNCCitationAnatomy of an hVNC Attack All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session,CitationHidden VNC will be invisible to other desktops windows.
Adversaries may also leverage cmd.exeCitationCybereason - Hidden Malicious Remote Access as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe,CitationLOLBAS Project GitHub Device Cred DepCitationSecureList BlueNoroff Device Cred Dev to hide windows.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
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