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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1564: Hide Artifacts

Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.[4]

EnterpriseT1564TechniqueObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1564: Hide Artifacts describes Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Cyb...

Executive priority

T1564: Hide Artifacts is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1564: Hide Artifacts by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (stealth), supported platforms (ESXi, Linux, macOS, Office Suite), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1564: Hide Artifacts appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Hide Artifacts

Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.[4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1564.012File/Path ExclusionsSub-techniqueFile/Path Exclusions subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.008Email Hiding RulesSub-techniqueEmail Hiding Rules subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-techniqueHidden Window subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.011Ignore Process InterruptsSub-techniqueIgnore Process Interrupts subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.002Hidden UsersSub-techniqueHidden Users subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.014Extended AttributesSub-techniqueExtended Attributes subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.009Resource ForkingSub-techniqueResource Forking subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.013Bind MountsSub-techniqueBind Mounts subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.006Run Virtual InstanceSub-techniqueRun Virtual Instance subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.010Process Argument SpoofingSub-techniqueProcess Argument Spoofing subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-techniqueHidden Files and Directories subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.004NTFS File AttributesSub-techniqueNTFS File Attributes subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.007VBA StompingSub-techniqueVBA Stomping subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1564.005Hidden File SystemSub-techniqueHidden File System subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0482: Bundlore

Bundlore is adware written for macOS that has been in use since at least 2015. Though categorized as adware, Bundlore has many features associated with more traditional backdoors.[1]

macOS
MalwareEnterprise

S1011: Tarrask

Tarrask is malware that has been used by HAFNIUM since at least August 2021. Tarrask was designed to evade digital defenses and maintain persistence by generating concealed scheduled tasks.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0670: WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.[1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0332: Remcos

Remcos is a closed-source tool that is marketed as a remote control and surveillance software by a company called Breaking Security. Remcos has been observed being used in malware campaigns.[1][2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7afbef43c47af552...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundle7afbef43c47a…
19.12.0Older bundle7afbef43c47a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Sofacy Komplex Trojan

    Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cybereason OSX Pirrit

    Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    MalwareBytes ADS July 2015

    Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Sophos Ragnar May 2020

    SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackT1564
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.