S1020: Kevin

S1020: Kevin describes [Kevin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1020) is a backdoor implant written in C++ that has been used by [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001) since at least June 2020, including in operations against organizations in Tunisia.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)

Executive priority

S1020: Kevin is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1020: Kevin by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1020: Kevin appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Kevin

Kevin is a backdoor implant written in C++ that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2020, including in operations against organizations in Tunisia.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques21 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1071.004	DNSSub-technique	Variants of Kevin can communicate over DNS through queries to the server for constructed domain names with embedded information.[1]
Enterprise	T1564.003	Hidden WindowSub-technique	Kevin can hide the current window from the targeted user via the `ShowWindow` API function.[1]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Kevin can collect the MAC address and other information from a victim machine using `ipconfig/all`.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	Kevin can Base32 encode chunks of output files during exfiltration.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Kevin can enumerate the OS version and hostname of a targeted machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Kevin can download files to the compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Kevin can send data from the victim host through a DNS C2 channel.[1]
Enterprise	T1572	Protocol Tunneling	Kevin can use a custom protocol tunneled through DNS or HTTP.[1]
Enterprise	T1030	Data Transfer Size Limits	Kevin can exfiltrate data to the C2 server in 27-character chunks.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	Kevin can delete files created on the victim's machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Variants of Kevin can communicate with C2 over HTTP.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Kevin can use the `ShowWindow` API to avoid detection.[1]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	Kevin can upload logs and other data from a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Kevin can use a renamed image of `cmd.exe` for execution.[1]
Enterprise	T1001.001	Junk DataSub-technique	Kevin can generate a sequence of dummy HTTP C2 requests to obscure traffic.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Kevin has Base64-encoded its configuration file.[1]
Enterprise	T1074	Data Staged	Kevin can create directories to store logs and other collected data.[1]
Enterprise	T1546.003	Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionSub-technique	Kevin can compile randomly-generated MOF files into the WMI repository to persistently run malware.[1]
Enterprise	T1008	Fallback Channels	Kevin can assign hard-coded fallback domains for C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1497	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Kevin can sleep for a time interval between C2 communication attempts.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.003	Rename Legitimate UtilitiesSub-technique	Kevin has renamed an image of `cmd.exe` with a random name followed by a `.tmpl` extension.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G1001: HEXANE

HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.1
Created: Jun 14, 2022, 14:27 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 17, 2024, 22:07 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 40e416f39fc37708...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 17, 2024, 22:07 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`40e416f39fc3…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 17, 2024, 22:07 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`40e416f39fc3…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021
Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS1020
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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