G0056: PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM is an activity group focused on espionage that has been active since at least 2012. The group has conducted operations globally with a heavy emphasis on Turkish targets. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0056: PROMETHIUM describes [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) is an activity group focused on espionage that has been active since at least 2012. The group has conducted operations globally with a heavy emphasis on Turkish targets. [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.(Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)(Citati...
Executive priority
G0056: PROMETHIUM is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0056: PROMETHIUM by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0056: PROMETHIUM appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM is an activity group focused on espionage that has been active since at least 2012. The group has conducted operations globally with a heavy emphasis on Turkish targets. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has attempted to get users to execute compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.[3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1587.002 | Code Signing CertificatesSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has created self-signed certificates to sign malicious installers.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1078.003 | Local AccountsSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has created admin accounts on a compromised host.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1587.003 | Digital CertificatesSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has created self-signed digital certificates for use in HTTPS C2 traffic.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has disguised malicious installer files by bundling them with legitimate software installers.[3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has named services to appear legitimate.[3][4] |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has signed code with self-signed certificates.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1205.001 | Port KnockingSub-technique | PROMETHIUM has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | PROMETHIUM has used watering hole attacks to deliver malicious versions of legitimate installers.[4] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0178: Truvasys
Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. [1] [2] [3]
S0491: StrongPity
StrongPity is an information stealing malware used by PROMETHIUM.[1][2]
C0033: C0033
C0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.1 | Current bundle | 941dc346c3a4… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.1 | Older bundle | aadc427c6fc8… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016
Microsoft. (2016, December 14). Twin zero-day attacks: PROMETHIUM and NEODYMIUM target individuals in Europe. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]Microsoft SIR Vol 21
Anthe, C. et al. (2016, December 14). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 21. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
- [3]Talos Promethium June 2020
Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020
Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [5]PROMETHIUM
(Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)
- [6]StrongPity
The name StrongPity has also been used to describe the group and the malware used by the group.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)
- [7]mitre-attackG0056Open source URL
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