S1089: SharpDisco
SharpDisco is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1089: SharpDisco describes [SharpDisco](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1089) is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by [MoustachedBouncer](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1019) since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)
Executive priority
S1089: SharpDisco is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1089: SharpDisco by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1089: SharpDisco appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
SharpDisco
SharpDisco is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | SharpDisco can create scheduled tasks to execute reverse shells that read and write data to and from specified SMB shares.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | SharpDisco can hide windows using `ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | SharpDisco has dropped a recent-files stealer plugin to `C:\Users\Public\WinSrcNT\It11.exe`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | SharpDisco can load a plugin to exfiltrate stolen files to SMB shares also used in C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.002 | File Transfer ProtocolsSub-technique | SharpDisco has the ability to transfer data between SMB shares.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | SharpDisco can use a plugin to enumerate system drives.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | SharpDisco can use `cmd.exe` to execute plugins and to send command output to specified SMB shares.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | SharpDisco can leverage Native APIs through plugins including `GetLogicalDrives`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | SharpDisco has dropped a plugin to monitor external drives to `C:\Users\Public\It3.exe`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | SharpDisco has been used to download a Python interpreter to `C:\Users\Public\WinTN\WinTN.exe` as well as other plugins from external sources.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | SharpDisco can identify recently opened files by using an LNK format parser to extract the original file path from LNK files found in either `%USERPROFILE%\Recent` (Windows XP) or `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent` (newer Windows versions) .[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1019: MoustachedBouncer
MoustachedBouncer is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014 targeting foreign embassies in Belarus.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 1a262e97cbc8… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 1a262e97cbc8… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 1a262e97cbc8… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023
Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1089Open source URL
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