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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0022: APT3

APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[1][2] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[1][3] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[4]

EnterpriseG0022GroupObject v1.4Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0022: APT3 describes [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)(Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victim...

Executive priority

G0022: APT3 is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0022: APT3 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0022: APT3 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT3

APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[1][2] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[1][3] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

44 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru "System".[3]

EnterpriseT1104Multi-Stage Channels

An APT3 downloader first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198[.]103 using TCP port 1913; once the server response is verified, it then requests a connection to 192.184.60[.]229 on TCP port 81.[3]

EnterpriseT1110.002Password CrackingSub-technique

APT3 has been known to brute force password hashes to be able to leverage plain text credentials.CitationAPT3 Adversary Emulation Plan

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

APT3 has been known to use -WindowStyle Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows.[3]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

APT3 has used tools to dump passwords from browsers.[4]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

An APT3 downloader uses the Windows command "cmd.exe" /C whoami. The group also uses a tool to execute commands on remote computers.[3][4]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

A keylogging tool used by APT3 gathers network information from the victim, including the MAC address, IP address, WINS, DHCP server, and gateway.[4]Citationevolution of pirpi

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

APT3 has a tool that can enumerate current network connections.[4]CitationFireEye Clandestine FoxCitationevolution of pirpi

EnterpriseT1090.002External ProxySub-technique

An APT3 downloader establishes SOCKS5 connections for its initial C2.[3]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

APT3 has a tool that can run DLLs.CitationFireEye Clandestine Fox

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

APT3 obfuscates files or information to help evade defensive measures.[4]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

APT3 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.[1]

EnterpriseT1098.007Additional Local or Domain GroupsSub-technique

APT3 has been known to add created accounts to local admin groups to maintain elevated access.Citationaptsim

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

APT3 has lured victims into clicking malicious links delivered through spearphishing.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

APT3 has a tool that exfiltrates data over the C2 channel.CitationFireEye Clandestine Fox

EnterpriseT1552.001Credentials In FilesSub-technique

APT3 has a tool that can locate credentials in files on the file system such as those from Firefox or Chrome.[4]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

APT3 has been known to stage files for exfiltration in a single location.Citationaptsim

EnterpriseT1078.002Domain AccountsSub-technique

APT3 leverages valid accounts after gaining credentials for use within the victim domain.[4]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

APT3 will identify Microsoft Office documents on the victim's computer.Citationaptsim

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

APT3 has exploited the Adobe Flash Player vulnerability CVE-2015-3113 and Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2014-1776.[1]CitationFireEye Clandestine Fox

EnterpriseT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique

APT3 will copy files over to Windows Admin Shares (like ADMIN$) as part of lateral movement.[4]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

APT3 has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools.CitationFireEye Clandestine FoxCitationFireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

APT3 has used a tool that can obtain info about local and global group users, power users, and administrators.[4]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

APT3 has a tool that can delete files.CitationFireEye Clandestine Fox

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

APT3 has a tool that looks for files and directories on the local file system.CitationFireEye Clandestine FoxCitationevolution of pirpi

EnterpriseT1546.008Accessibility FeaturesSub-technique

APT3 replaces the Sticky Keys binary C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe for persistence.Citationaptsim

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

APT3 has used tools to compress data before exfilling it.Citationaptsim

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

APT3 has a tool that can obtain information about the local system.[4]Citationevolution of pirpi

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

APT3 has used PowerShell on victim systems to download and run payloads after exploitation.[3]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

APT3 has a tool that creates a new service for persistence.[3]

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

APT3 has used a tool to dump credentials by injecting itself into lsass.exe and triggering with the argument "dig."[4]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

APT3 places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.[3]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

APT3 enables the Remote Desktop Protocol for persistence.Citationaptsim APT3 has also interacted with compromised systems to browse and copy files through RDP sessions.CitationTwitter Cglyer Status Update APT3 eml

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

APT3 has a tool that can list out currently running processes.CitationFireEye Clandestine FoxCitationevolution of pirpi

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

An APT3 downloader establishes SOCKS5 connections for its initial C2.[3]

EnterpriseT1069Permission Groups Discovery

APT3 has a tool that can enumerate the permissions associated with Windows groups.[4]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

APT3 has a tool that can detect the existence of remote systems.[4]CitationFireEye Clandestine Fox

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

APT3 has used a keylogging tool that records keystrokes in encrypted files.[4]

EnterpriseT1036.010Masquerade Account NameSub-technique

APT3 has been known to create or enable accounts, such as support_388945a0.Citationaptsim

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

APT3 has been known to pack their tools.CitationAPT3 Adversary Emulation Plan[1]

EnterpriseT1136.001Local AccountSub-technique

APT3 has been known to create or enable accounts, such as support_388945a0.Citationaptsim

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

APT3 has a tool that can copy files to remote machines.CitationFireEye Clandestine Fox

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

An APT3 downloader uses the Windows command "cmd.exe" /C whoami to verify that it is running with the elevated privileges of “System.”[3]

EnterpriseT1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsSub-technique

APT3 has been known to remove indicators of compromise from tools.CitationAPT3 Adversary Emulation Plan

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0111: schtasks

schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time. [1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0349: LaZagne

LaZagne is a post-exploitation, open-source tool used to recover stored passwords on a system. It has modules for Windows, Linux, and OSX, but is mainly focused on Windows systems. LaZagne is publicly available on GitHub.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1104: Multi-Stage ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1110.002: Password CrackingEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0165: OSInfoEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1564.003: Hidden WindowEnterpriseuses · ToolS0111: schtasksEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0013: PlugXEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555.003: Credentials from Web BrowsersEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.002: External ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.002: Spearphishing LinkEnterpriseuses · ToolS0349: LaZagneEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1098.007: Additional Local or Domain GroupsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1552.001: Credentials In FilesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1078.002: Domain AccountsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1203: Exploitation for Client ExecutionEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e7da6b0f5162d9c9...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.4Current bundlee7da6b0f5162…
19.11.4Older bundleec7ee360150a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye Clandestine Wolf

    Eng, E., Caselden, D.. (2015, June 23). Operation Clandestine Wolf – Adobe Flash Zero-Day in APT3 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 14, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Recorded Future APT3 May 2017

    Insikt Group (Recorded Future). (2017, May 17). Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3. Retrieved September 16, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    FireEye Operation Double Tap

    Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Symantec Buckeye

    Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    APT3

    (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)

  6. [6]
    Buckeye

    (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)

  7. [7]
    Gothic Panda

    (Citation: PWC Pirpi Scanbox) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)

  8. [8]
    PWC Pirpi Scanbox

    Lancaster, T. (2015, July 25). A tale of Pirpi, Scanbox & CVE-2015-3113. Retrieved March 30, 2016.

  9. [9]
    Pirpi

    (Citation: PWC Pirpi Scanbox)

  10. [10]
    TG-0110

    (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)

  11. [11]
    Threat Group-0110

    (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)

  12. [12]
    UPS Team

    (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)

  13. [13]
    mitre-attackG0022
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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