S0692: SILENTTRINITY
MITRE ATT&CK S0692: SILENTTRINITY Tool details for Windows, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
SILENTTRINITY matters because it is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework for Windows, with stagers in PowerShell, C, and Boo and a Python-based framework. ATT&CK links it to behaviors that span credential access, discovery, execution, lateral movement, collection, stealth, and exfiltration. For leaders, the practical issue is not the tool name alone; it is whether the organization can see and control the Windows administration paths an intruder could abuse after initial access.
Executive priority
Prioritize SILENTTRINITY as a readiness test for Windows endpoint visibility, privileged-access governance, and incident response decision-making. The relationship set includes LSASS memory access, PowerShell and command-shell execution, WMI, DCOM, WinRM, group and system discovery, keylogging/input capture, file deletion, and exfiltration over an existing C2 channel. Executives should ask whether SOC evidence can distinguish legitimate administration from post-exploitation activity, whether privileged credentials are protected from endpoint compromise, and whether IR teams can reconstruct activity if files or indicators are removed.
Technical view
The object has no official ATT&CK detection guidance, so defenders should validate coverage against the related techniques rather than relying on a tool signature. On Windows, focus on correlated behavior: script or command execution followed by discovery of users, groups, services, processes, registry, files, and remote systems; suspicious LSASS access; WMI, DCOM, or WinRM activity used for remote execution or movement; process injection indicators; keylogging or GUI credential prompt behavior where telemetry exists; file deletion after tool activity; and outbound data movement over the same channel used for command and control. Tune detections to account for legitimate administrative tooling, especially PowerShell, WMI, WinRM, DCOM, service queries, and domain/group enumeration.
Likely telemetry
- Windows process creation and command-line telemetry for PowerShell, cmd, Python, service queries, registry queries, user/group discovery, and file discovery
- PowerShell logging and script block/module logging where enabled
- Windows event logs for WMI, WinRM, DCOM-related remote activity, service control, and authentication context
- Endpoint telemetry for LSASS process access, memory access attempts, process injection, and suspicious child-process chains
- Registry access telemetry for discovery-oriented queries
Detection direction
- Build behavior-based detections around the ATT&CK relationships, not just the SILENTTRINITY name or hash.
- Correlate execution plus discovery: PowerShell/cmd/Python activity followed by service, process, registry, user, group, file, or remote-system enumeration is higher value than any single command.
- Validate alerting for LSASS memory access and credential-access precursors, especially from unusual processes or administrative sessions.
- Review WMI, WinRM, and DCOM use by account, host, and time of day; these are common administrative paths and require baselining to reduce false positives.
- Look for cleanup behavior such as file deletion after execution or discovery activity, because indicator removal may reduce forensic evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Harden privileged access first: limit administrative rights, monitor privileged sessions, and reduce opportunities for LSASS credential theft.
- Control and audit Windows remote administration paths such as WMI, WinRM, and DCOM according to business need.
- Constrain script and command execution where operationally feasible, with special attention to PowerShell and Python use on Windows endpoints.
- Improve logging retention and centralization so file deletion or indicator removal does not eliminate the only evidence of intrusion activity.
- Segment and monitor systems where remote discovery and lateral movement would create high business impact.
Additional notes and limits
SILENTTRINITY is described by ATT&CK as open source and was reported in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors. The supplied object is Windows-focused, while several related techniques have broader platform descriptions; this take treats the tool platform as Windows and uses the relationships to identify defensive validation areas.
ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this software object, and the object-level tactics are not specified. The relationship context supports likely behavior categories, but local telemetry, baselines, controls, and incident evidence are required to determine actual exposure or detection coverage. This summary does not assert current exploitation, attribution, or customer impact.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
SILENTTRINITY
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
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Object version and sync metadata
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Mirrored ATT&CK source object
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