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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S9010: GlassWorm

GlassWorm is a worm that propagated through supply chain attacks by compromising repository credentials from victim environments and having malicious payloads added to those compromised accounts for distribution to victims across the various development ecosystems.[1][2][3] GlassWorm has numerous variants, including Rust binaries, encrypted JavaScript and a variant leveraging invisible Unicode characters that made reverse engineering difficult.[4][1][5] GlassWorm has employed a unique command and control (C2) methodology using Solana blockchain.[6][1] GlassWorm was first reported in October 2025.[6][1][3]

EnterpriseS9010MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S9010: GlassWorm describes [GlassWorm](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9010) is a worm that propagated through supply chain attacks by compromising repository credentials from victim environments and having malicious payloads added to those compromised accounts for distribution to victims across the various development ecosystems.(Citation: Koi Glassworm InvisibleCode October 2025)(Citation: Aikido GlassWorm October 2025)(Citation: Socket GlassWorm January 2026) [GlassWorm](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9010) has numerous variants, i...

Executive priority

S9010: GlassWorm is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S9010: GlassWorm by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (macOS, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S9010: GlassWorm appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

GlassWorm

GlassWorm is a worm that propagated through supply chain attacks by compromising repository credentials from victim environments and having malicious payloads added to those compromised accounts for distribution to victims across the various development ecosystems.[1][2][3] GlassWorm has numerous variants, including Rust binaries, encrypted JavaScript and a variant leveraging invisible Unicode characters that made reverse engineering difficult.[4][1][5] GlassWorm has employed a unique command and control (C2) methodology using Solana blockchain.[6][1] GlassWorm was first reported in October 2025.[6][1][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

36 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1213.006DatabasesSub-technique

GlassWorm has collected data from macOS devices through the gathering of Apple Notes related files by targeting `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite`, `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite-wal`, and `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite-shm`.[3]

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

GlassWorm has distributed C2 using BitTorrent’s Distributed Hash Table (DHT) network to harness a decentralized command capability.[1]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

GlassWorm has utilized logic to avoid executing on Russian based devices.[3]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

GlassWorm has the ability to check the system’s time zone on the victim device.[3]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

GlassWorm has archived collected files within a zip file prior to exfiltration to include `/tmp/out.zip`.[3]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

GlassWorm has used HTTP for C2 and extracts data from the HTTP response headers.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.001Launch AgentSub-technique

GlassWorm has established persistence on macOS via a LaunchAgent by writing a plist under `/library/LaunchAgents`.[4][3]

EnterpriseT1090.001Internal ProxySub-technique

GlassWorm has leveraged peer-to-peer software to facilitate communications within the victim network to include the software WebRTC.[1] GlassWorm has also established a SOCKS proxy to interact with victim devices that also acted as a proxy node for follow-on behaviors.[1]

EnterpriseT1602.002Network Device Configuration DumpSub-technique

GlassWorm has gathered data pertaining to VPN configurations.[4][3] GlassWorm has also targeted locally stored data on macOS located in `/Library/Application Support/Fortinet/FortiClient/conf/vpn.plist`.[3]

EnterpriseT1555.001KeychainSub-technique

GlassWorm has collected keys stored within `/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db`.[4][3]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

GlassWorm has decoded its Base64 instructions.[1] GlassWorm has also decrypted its AES protected payloads.[4][1][3]

EnterpriseT1678Delay Execution

GlassWorm has used a timeout function set to `9e5` which delays execution 900,000 milliseconds or 15 minutes to avoid detection.[4]

EnterpriseT1539Steal Web Session Cookie

GlassWorm has harvested Safari cookies stored within `/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Cookies/ Cookies.binarycookies`.[3] GlassWorm has also stolen cookies within Chromium and Firefox browsers.[4][3]

EnterpriseT1102.001Dead Drop ResolverSub-technique

GlassWorm has leveraged blockchain-based C2 infrastructure to include Solana blockchain that contains additional C2 details within the memo field.[4][6][1][2][3][5] GlassWorm has also leveraged Google Calendar to host encoded data.[1][3][5]

EnterpriseT1213.003Code RepositoriesSub-technique

GlassWorm has gathered code repository authentication materials for NPM and GitHub.[4][1][3] GlassWorm has collected details pertaining to the npm configuration data for `_authToken`.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

GlassWorm has gathered credentials stored in Mozilla FireFox and Chromium-based Browsers.[4][3]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

GlassWorm has collected local data from a compromised host to include desktop cryptocurrency wallet data, and documents from within Desktop, Documents, and Downloads.[3]

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

GlassWorm has leveraged Hidden Virtual Network Computing (HVNC) to remain undetected and conduct execution of collection and communication actions.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

GlassWorm has leveraged AES-256-CBC encryption to obfuscate its malicious JavaScript payload.[4][1][3][5] GlassWorm has also utilized Base64 encoding to obfuscate the C2 details stored in the Solana memo field.[4][1][5]

EnterpriseT1657Financial Theft

GlassWorm has the ability to steal credentials for cryptocurrency wallets.[4][1][3]

EnterpriseT1036Masquerading

GlassWorm has masqueraded as legitimate VSCode extensions.[2][5] GlassWorm has also impersonated Github projects.[2]

EnterpriseT1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsSub-technique

GlassWorm has spread through Visual Studio extensions.[1][2][3] GlassWorm has also spread through JavaScript projects hosted on Github.[2]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

GlassWorm has staged collected data in a working directory within a temp folder to include `/tmp/ijewf`.[4][3]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

GlassWorm has set registry run keys for persistence in both `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` and `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\`.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.018Invisible UnicodeSub-technique

GlassWorm has utilized invisible Unicode Private Use Area (PUA) characters to obfuscate its malicious code so that it does not render in code editors.[4][1][2]

EnterpriseT1565.002Transmitted Data ManipulationSub-technique

GlassWorm can intercept and modify transaction details associated with hardware wallet applications before signing.[4]

EnterpriseT1614System Location Discovery

GlassWorm has leveraged geofencing logic to detect whether it is operating in a Russian associated time zone to determine whether it continues to execute.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.002AppleScriptSub-technique

GlassWorm has utilized AppleScript to include `set keychainPassword to do shell script` to execute shell command that retrieves passwords from the macOS keychain.[4]

EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

GlassWorm has leveraged JavaScript to execute its malicious code to include its hidden Unicode characters using the `eval` call.[6][1][2][3] GlassWorm has also utilized encrypted payloads compiled in JavaScript.[4]

EnterpriseT1614.001System Language DiscoverySub-technique

GlassWorm has identified the system language settings by checking for `ru_RU`, `ru-RU`, `ru`, and `Russian` to prevent execution in a Russian associated device.[3]

EnterpriseT1217Browser Information Discovery

GlassWorm has searched browser data for cookies, history, login databases, and cryptocurrency wallets.[3]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

GlassWorm has utilized Google Calendar as backup C2.[1][5]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

GlassWorm has the ability to check the OS of the victim host.[3][5] GlassWorm has checked whether the OS platform value includes `darwin` prior to execution of macOS specific scripts.[3][5]

EnterpriseT1554Compromise Host Software Binary

GlassWorm can modify hardware wallet applications.[4]

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

GlassWorm has searched for existing wallet applications to include Ledger Live and Trezor Suite.[4]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

GlassWorm has downloaded additional payloads from C2.[4][6][3][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b47c79ee879661c3...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundleb47c79ee8796…
19.21.0Older bundleb47c79ee8796…
19.11.0Older bundleb47c79ee8796…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Koi Glassworm InvisibleCode October 2025

    Idan Dardikman. (2025, October 18). GlassWorm: First Self-Propagating Worm Using Invisible Code Hits OpenVSX Marketplace. Retrieved April 10, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Aikido GlassWorm October 2025

    Ilyas Makari. (2025, October 31). The Return of the Invisible Threat: Hidden PUA Unicode Hits GitHub repositorties. Retrieved April 10, 2026.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Socket GlassWorm January 2026

    Kirill Boychenko. (2026, January 31). GlassWorm Loader Hits Open VSX via Developer Account Compromise. Retrieved April 10, 2026.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Koi Glassworm New Tricks December 2025

    Gal Hachamov. (2025, December 29). GlassWorm Goes Mac: Fresh Infrastructure, New Tricks. Retrieved April 10, 2026.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Koi GlassWorm Rust December 2025

    Lotan Sery. (2025, December 10). GlassWorm Goes Native: Same Infrastructure, Hardened Delivery. Retrieved April 10, 2026.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Koi Glassworm Extensions November 2025

    Idan Dardikman, Yuval Ronen, Lotan Sery. (2025, November 6). GlassWorm Returns: New Wave Strikes as We Expose Attacker Infrastructure. Retrieved April 10, 2026.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS9010
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.