S9010: GlassWorm

GlassWorm matters because it targets the software delivery chain rather than only individual endpoints. The supplied ATT&CK entry describes a worm that spread by compromising repository credentials and adding malicious payloads for distribution across development ecosystems, with variants using Rust binaries, encrypted JavaScript, invisible Unicode, and Solana blockchain-based C2. For leaders, this makes GlassWorm a risk to developer trust, release integrity, and incident scoping, especially where repository credentials, extensions, packages, and developer workstations are not monitored together.

Executive priority

Prioritize GlassWorm as a software supply chain and identity-control validation case. Key executive questions are: which repository credentials and tokens can publish code or packages; whether changes to dependencies, extensions, and repositories are auditable; whether macOS and Windows developer endpoints have sufficient telemetry; and whether incident response can quickly revoke credentials, validate source integrity, and determine downstream distribution exposure. This is also useful compliance evidence for access control, change management, logging, and secure development lifecycle controls.

Technical view

The object has no ATT&CK tactics specified and no official detection text, but its relationships indicate behavior spanning supply chain initial access, script execution, persistence, discovery, collection, credential access, stealth/obfuscation, and command-and-control. SOC and IR teams should validate coverage around compromised repository credentials, malicious dependency or development-tool updates, JavaScript and AppleScript execution, encrypted or encoded files, invisible Unicode in source or package content, macOS Launch Agents, Windows Run Keys or Startup Folder entries, local data staging, browser/session-cookie access, code repository and database collection, HTTP/S C2, fallback channels, dead-drop resolver behavior, internal proxying, and ingress tool transfer. Treat developer workstations, repository SaaS logs, package or extension publishing workflows, and outbound network telemetry as a combined detection surface rather than separate control domains.

Likely telemetry

Code repository audit logs: authentication events, token use, credential changes, publishing activity, commits, package or extension updates, and anomalous access to private repositories.
Developer endpoint telemetry on macOS and Windows: process creation, script interpreter activity, file writes, persistence locations, and security tool events.
macOS-specific telemetry: osascript or AppleScript execution and Launch Agent plist creation or modification.
Windows-specific telemetry: Registry Run Key changes, Startup Folder writes, script execution, and process ancestry for unexpected JavaScript/JScript activity.
Source, package, and artifact scanning results for encrypted or encoded content, invisible or non-printing Unicode characters, masqueraded files, and unexpected Rust binaries or JavaScript payloads.

Detection direction

Because MITRE provides no official detection guidance for this object, start with control validation mapped to the related techniques rather than assuming existing malware signatures are sufficient.
Correlate repository events with endpoint activity: suspicious publishing or commit activity should be reviewed alongside the developer host that held the credential or token.
Tune for developer-environment false positives: JavaScript, AppleScript, Rust binaries, package publishing, and repository access can be normal in engineering workflows, so detections should emphasize unusual process lineage, new persistence, encoded content, invisible Unicode, unexpected destinations, and credential use outside normal patterns.
Add review logic for invisible or non-printing Unicode in source code, package manifests, extensions, scripts, and build artifacts, since visual code review may miss this behavior.
Validate macOS and Windows persistence monitoring separately: Launch Agents on macOS and Run Keys or Startup Folder entries on Windows represent different evidence paths.

Mitigation priorities

Harden repository identity first: enforce least privilege for publishing rights, strong authentication, scoped and short-lived tokens where feasible, rapid token revocation, and review of dormant or over-privileged developer accounts.
Protect the software delivery path: require review and provenance checks for dependency, extension, package, and build artifact changes; monitor for unexpected maintainership or publishing changes.
Improve secure code and artifact review for obfuscation indicators, including encrypted or encoded payloads and invisible Unicode characters.
Strengthen developer endpoint controls on macOS and Windows, including monitoring and restriction of unauthorized persistence mechanisms, script execution abuse, and unexpected tool downloads.
Prepare IR playbooks for supply chain compromise: revoke repository credentials, preserve audit logs, validate affected commits/packages/extensions, identify downstream distribution, and coordinate rollback or notification decisions.

Analyst notes and limits

This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK software object, external references, and stated relationships. The strongest decision value is the intersection of software supply chain compromise, developer identity, endpoint persistence, obfuscated code, and C2 resilience. GlassWorm is officially listed for macOS and Windows in the supplied object; several related techniques include broader platforms, but those should be treated as technique context rather than confirmed GlassWorm platform scope.

The ATT&CK object provides no official detection text, no specified tactics on the software object, and no environment-specific indicators. The external references are listed but not expanded beyond the supplied descriptions. Local repository architecture, package ecosystems, developer endpoint baselines, token practices, and logging coverage are required to determine actual exposure and detection confidence.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

GlassWorm

GlassWorm is a worm that propagated through supply chain attacks by compromising repository credentials from victim environments and having malicious payloads added to those compromised accounts for distribution to victims across the various development ecosystems.[1][2][3] GlassWorm has numerous variants, including Rust binaries, encrypted JavaScript and a variant leveraging invisible Unicode characters that made reverse engineering difficult.[4][1][5] GlassWorm has employed a unique command and control (C2) methodology using Solana blockchain.[6][1] GlassWorm was first reported in October 2025.[6][1][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques 36 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1213.006	Databases Sub-technique	GlassWorm has collected data from macOS devices through the gathering of Apple Notes related files by targeting `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite`, `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite-wal`, and `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite-shm`.[3]
Enterprise	T1571	Non-Standard Port	GlassWorm has distributed C2 using BitTorrent’s Distributed Hash Table (DHT) network to harness a decentralized command capability.[1]
Enterprise	T1480	Execution Guardrails	GlassWorm has utilized logic to avoid executing on Russian based devices.[3]
Enterprise	T1124	System Time Discovery	GlassWorm has the ability to check the system’s time zone on the victim device.[3]
Enterprise	T1560.001	Archive via Utility Sub-technique	GlassWorm has archived collected files within a zip file prior to exfiltration to include `/tmp/out.zip`.[3]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web Protocols Sub-technique	GlassWorm has used HTTP for C2 and extracts data from the HTTP response headers.[1]
Enterprise	T1543.001	Launch Agent Sub-technique	GlassWorm has established persistence on macOS via a LaunchAgent by writing a plist under `/library/LaunchAgents`.[4][3]
Enterprise	T1090.001	Internal Proxy Sub-technique	GlassWorm has leveraged peer-to-peer software to facilitate communications within the victim network to include the software WebRTC.[1] GlassWorm has also established a SOCKS proxy to interact with victim devices that also acted as a proxy node for follow-on behaviors.[1]
Enterprise	T1602.002	Network Device Configuration Dump Sub-technique	GlassWorm has gathered data pertaining to VPN configurations.[4][3] GlassWorm has also targeted locally stored data on macOS located in `/Library/Application Support/Fortinet/FortiClient/conf/vpn.plist`.[3]
Enterprise	T1555.001	Keychain Sub-technique	GlassWorm has collected keys stored within `/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db`.[4][3]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	GlassWorm has decoded its Base64 instructions.[1] GlassWorm has also decrypted its AES protected payloads.[4][1][3]
Enterprise	T1678	Delay Execution	GlassWorm has used a timeout function set to `9e5` which delays execution 900,000 milliseconds or 15 minutes to avoid detection.[4]
Enterprise	T1539	Steal Web Session Cookie	GlassWorm has harvested Safari cookies stored within `/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Cookies/ Cookies.binarycookies`.[3] GlassWorm has also stolen cookies within Chromium and Firefox browsers.[4][3]
Enterprise	T1102.001	Dead Drop Resolver Sub-technique	GlassWorm has leveraged blockchain-based C2 infrastructure to include Solana blockchain that contains additional C2 details within the memo field.[4][6][1][2][3][5] GlassWorm has also leveraged Google Calendar to host encoded data.[1][3][5]
Enterprise	T1213.003	Code Repositories Sub-technique	GlassWorm has gathered code repository authentication materials for NPM and GitHub.[4][1][3] GlassWorm has collected details pertaining to the npm configuration data for `_authToken`.[1][3]
Enterprise	T1555.003	Credentials from Web Browsers Sub-technique	GlassWorm has gathered credentials stored in Mozilla FireFox and Chromium-based Browsers.[4][3]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	GlassWorm has collected local data from a compromised host to include desktop cryptocurrency wallet data, and documents from within Desktop, Documents, and Downloads.[3]
Enterprise	T1564.003	Hidden Window Sub-technique	GlassWorm has leveraged Hidden Virtual Network Computing (HVNC) to remain undetected and conduct execution of collection and communication actions.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded File Sub-technique	GlassWorm has leveraged AES-256-CBC encryption to obfuscate its malicious JavaScript payload.[4][1][3][5] GlassWorm has also utilized Base64 encoding to obfuscate the C2 details stored in the Solana memo field.[4][1][5]
Enterprise	T1657	Financial Theft	GlassWorm has the ability to steal credentials for cryptocurrency wallets.[4][1][3]
Enterprise	T1036	Masquerading	GlassWorm has masqueraded as legitimate VSCode extensions.[2][5] GlassWorm has also impersonated Github projects.[2]
Enterprise	T1195.001	Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Sub-technique	GlassWorm has spread through Visual Studio extensions.[1][2][3] GlassWorm has also spread through JavaScript projects hosted on Github.[2]
Enterprise	T1074.001	Local Data Staging Sub-technique	GlassWorm has staged collected data in a working directory within a temp folder to include `/tmp/ijewf`.[4][3]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique	GlassWorm has set registry run keys for persistence in both `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` and `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\`.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.018	Invisible Unicode Sub-technique	GlassWorm has utilized invisible Unicode Private Use Area (PUA) characters to obfuscate its malicious code so that it does not render in code editors.[4][1][2]
Enterprise	T1565.002	Transmitted Data Manipulation Sub-technique	GlassWorm can intercept and modify transaction details associated with hardware wallet applications before signing.[4]
Enterprise	T1614	System Location Discovery	GlassWorm has leveraged geofencing logic to detect whether it is operating in a Russian associated time zone to determine whether it continues to execute.[3]
Enterprise	T1059.002	AppleScript Sub-technique	GlassWorm has utilized AppleScript to include `set keychainPassword to do shell script` to execute shell command that retrieves passwords from the macOS keychain.[4]
Enterprise	T1059.007	JavaScript Sub-technique	GlassWorm has leveraged JavaScript to execute its malicious code to include its hidden Unicode characters using the `eval` call.[6][1][2][3] GlassWorm has also utilized encrypted payloads compiled in JavaScript.[4]
Enterprise	T1614.001	System Language Discovery Sub-technique	GlassWorm has identified the system language settings by checking for `ru_RU`, `ru-RU`, `ru`, and `Russian` to prevent execution in a Russian associated device.[3]
Enterprise	T1217	Browser Information Discovery	GlassWorm has searched browser data for cookies, history, login databases, and cryptocurrency wallets.[3]
Enterprise	T1008	Fallback Channels	GlassWorm has utilized Google Calendar as backup C2.[1][5]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	GlassWorm has the ability to check the OS of the victim host.[3][5] GlassWorm has checked whether the OS platform value includes `darwin` prior to execution of macOS specific scripts.[3][5]
Enterprise	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary	GlassWorm can modify hardware wallet applications.[4]
Enterprise	T1518	Software Discovery	GlassWorm has searched for existing wallet applications to include Ledger Live and Trezor Suite.[4]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	GlassWorm has downloaded additional payloads from C2.[4][6][3][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.0
Created: Apr 10, 2026, 16:59 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 24, 2026, 02:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: b47c79ee879661c3...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jun 3, 2026, 07:54 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 24, 2026, 02:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`b47c79ee8796…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Koi Glassworm InvisibleCode October 2025

Idan Dardikman. (2025, October 18). GlassWorm: First Self-Propagating Worm Using Invisible Code Hits OpenVSX Marketplace. Retrieved April 10, 2026.
Open source URL
[2]
Aikido GlassWorm October 2025

Ilyas Makari. (2025, October 31). The Return of the Invisible Threat: Hidden PUA Unicode Hits GitHub repositorties. Retrieved April 10, 2026.
Open source URL
[3]
Socket GlassWorm January 2026

Kirill Boychenko. (2026, January 31). GlassWorm Loader Hits Open VSX via Developer Account Compromise. Retrieved April 10, 2026.
Open source URL
[4]
Koi Glassworm New Tricks December 2025

Gal Hachamov. (2025, December 29). GlassWorm Goes Mac: Fresh Infrastructure, New Tricks. Retrieved April 10, 2026.
Open source URL
[5]
Koi GlassWorm Rust December 2025

Lotan Sery. (2025, December 10). GlassWorm Goes Native: Same Infrastructure, Hardened Delivery. Retrieved April 10, 2026.
Open source URL
[6]
Koi Glassworm Extensions November 2025

Idan Dardikman, Yuval Ronen, Lotan Sery. (2025, November 6). GlassWorm Returns: New Wave Strikes as We Expose Attacker Infrastructure. Retrieved April 10, 2026.
Open source URL
[7]
mitre-attack S9010
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use

Analyst context for executives and security teams