S0262: QuasarRAT
Security context for executives and security teams
S0262: QuasarRAT describes [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) is an open-source, remote access tool that has been publicly available on GitHub since at least 2014. [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) is developed in the C# language.(Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)
Executive priority
S0262: QuasarRAT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0262: QuasarRAT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0262: QuasarRAT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
QuasarRAT
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | QuasarRAT can hide process windows and make web requests invisible to the compromised user. Requests marked as invisible have been sent with user-agent string `Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_3) AppleWebKit/537.75.14 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/7.0.3 Safari/7046A194A` though QuasarRAT can only be run on Windows systems.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1614 | System Location Discovery | QuasarRAT can determine the country a victim host is located in.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique | QuasarRAT has the ability to set file attributes to "hidden" to hide files from the compromised user's view in Windows File Explorer.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | QuasarRAT can enumerate the username and account type.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | QuasarRAT can generate a UAC pop-up Window to prompt the target user to run a command as the administrator.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | QuasarRAT can retrieve files from compromised client machines.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | QuasarRAT can use TCP for C2 communication.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | QuasarRAT has the ability to enumerate the Wide Area Network (WAN) IP through requests to ip-api[.]com, freegeoip[.]net, or api[.]ipify[.]org observed with user-agent string `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0`.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | |
| Enterprise | T1552.001 | Credentials In FilesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | QuasarRAT can use port 4782 on the compromised host for TCP callbacks.CitationCISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018 |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1010 | Application Window Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1125 | Video Capture |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
G0040: Patchwork
Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.[1] [2][3][4]
G0078: Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. [1]
G0045: menuPass
menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]
menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]
G0135: BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. BackdoorDiplomacy has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.[1]
G0140: LazyScripter
LazyScripter is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.[1]
G0099: APT-C-36
APT-C-36 is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. APT-C-36 has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.2 | Current bundle | a58e9da18a8c… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.2 | Older bundle | a58e9da18a8c… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]GitHub QuasarRAT
MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Volexity Patchwork June 2018
Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017
Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]Securelist APT10 March 2021
GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021.
Open source URL - [5]QuasarRAT
(Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT) (Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018) (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)
- [6]mitre-attackS0262Open source URL
- [7]xRAT
(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
