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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0669: KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.[1]

EnterpriseS0669MalwareObject v1.2Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0669: KOCTOPUS describes [KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669)'s batch variant is loader used by [LazyScripter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140) since 2018 to launch [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) and [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) and, in some cases, [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262). [KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669) also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)

Executive priority

S0669: KOCTOPUS is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0669: KOCTOPUS by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0669: KOCTOPUS appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

20 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

KOCTOPUS will attempt to delete or disable all Registry keys and scheduled tasks related to Microsoft Security Defender and Security Essentials.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has been distributed via spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

KOCTOPUS has deobfuscated itself before executing its commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has relied on victims clicking a malicious document for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

KOCTOPUS has deployed a modified version of Invoke-Ngrok to expose open local ports to the Internet.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

KOCTOPUS has added and deleted keys from the Registry.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has been distributed as a malicious link within an email.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

KOCTOPUS has checked the OS version using `wmic.exe` and the `find` command.[1]

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has used -WindowsStyle Hidden to hide the command window.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has used `cmd.exe` and batch files for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

KOCTOPUS has executed a PowerShell command to download a file to the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has relied on victims clicking on a malicious link delivered via email.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.009Clear PersistenceSub-technique

KOCTOPUS can delete created registry keys used for persistence as part of its cleanup procedure.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has been disguised as legitimate software programs associated with the travel and airline industries.CitationArghire LazyScripter

EnterpriseT1106Native API

KOCTOPUS can use the `LoadResource` and `CreateProcessW` APIs for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has used PowerShell commands to download additional files.[1]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

KOCTOPUS will perform UAC bypass either through fodhelper.exe or eventvwr.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.010Command ObfuscationSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has obfuscated scripts with the BatchEncryption tool.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

KOCTOPUS has used VBScript to call wscript to execute a PowerShell command.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

KOCTOPUS can set the AutoRun Registry key with a PowerShell command.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
03fe1b6e635b0dfd...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle03fe1b6e635b…
19.11.2Older bundle03fe1b6e635b…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021

    Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    KOCTOPUS

    (Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0669
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.