G1019: MoustachedBouncer
MoustachedBouncer is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014 targeting foreign embassies in Belarus.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
G1019: MoustachedBouncer describes [MoustachedBouncer](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1019) is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014 targeting foreign embassies in Belarus.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)
Executive priority
G1019: MoustachedBouncer is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G1019: MoustachedBouncer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G1019: MoustachedBouncer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
MoustachedBouncer
MoustachedBouncer is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014 targeting foreign embassies in Belarus.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | MoustachedBouncer has used plugins to execute PowerShell scripts.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScriptSub-technique | MoustachedBouncer has used JavaScript to deliver malware hosted on HTML pages.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | MoustachedBouncer has used malware plugins packed with Themida.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | MoustachedBouncer has used plugins to take screenshots on targeted systems.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | MoustachedBouncer has used a reverse proxy tool similar to the GitHub repository revsocks.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | MoustachedBouncer has exploited CVE-2021-1732 to execute malware components with elevated rights.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.002 | Remote Data StagingSub-technique | MoustachedBouncer has used plugins to save captured screenshots to `.\AActdata\` on an SMB share.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1659 | Content Injection | MoustachedBouncer has injected content into DNS, HTTP, and SMB replies to redirect specifically-targeted victims to a fake Windows Update page to download malware.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1090: NightClub
NightClub is a modular implant written in C++ that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2014.[1]
S1088: Disco
Disco is a custom implant that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 including in campaigns using targeted malicious content injection for initial access and command and control.[1]
S1089: SharpDisco
SharpDisco is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | e047f02209a9… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 89fccc64214a… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023
Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackG1019Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.