G0078: Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0078: Gorgon Group describes [Gorgon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0078) is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. (Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)
Executive priority
G0078: Gorgon Group is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0078: Gorgon Group by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0078: Gorgon Group appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1055.012 | Process HollowingSub-technique | Gorgon Group malware can use process hollowing to inject one of its trojans into another process.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | Gorgon Group malware can attempt to disable security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender using the |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Gorgon Group malware can decode contents from a payload that was Base64 encoded and write the contents to a file.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Gorgon Group malware can leverage the Windows API call, CreateProcessA(), for execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | Gorgon Group malware can use PowerShell commands to download and execute a payload and open a decoy document on the victim’s machine.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | Gorgon Group malware can use cmd.exe to download and execute payloads and to execute commands on the system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Gorgon Group malware can download additional files from C2 servers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | Gorgon Group sent emails to victims with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | Gorgon Group has used |
| Enterprise | T1055.002 | Portable Executable InjectionSub-technique | Gorgon Group malware can download a remote access tool, ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | Gorgon Group malware can deactivate security mechanisms in Microsoft Office by editing several keys and values under |
| Enterprise | T1547.009 | Shortcut ModificationSub-technique | Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Gorgon Group attempted to get users to launch malicious Microsoft Office attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | Gorgon Group has obtained and used tools such as QuasarRAT and Remcos.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | Gorgon Group has used macros in Spearphishing Attachments as well as executed VBScripts on victim machines.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0336: NanoCore
S0262: QuasarRAT
S0332: Remcos
S0385: njRAT
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.5 | Current bundle | 8815ec420a16… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.5 | Older bundle | dc2aa87bf2f9… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018
Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Gorgon Group
(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)
- [3]mitre-attackG0078Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
