S0491: StrongPity
StrongPity is an information stealing malware used by PROMETHIUM.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0491: StrongPity describes [StrongPity](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0491) is an information stealing malware used by [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056).(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)(Citation: Talos Promethium June 2020)
Executive priority
S0491: StrongPity is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0491: StrongPity by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0491: StrongPity appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
StrongPity
StrongPity is an information stealing malware used by PROMETHIUM.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | StrongPity can automatically exfiltrate collected documents to the C2 server.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | StrongPity has the ability to hide the console window for its document search module from the user.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | StrongPity has used HTTPS over port 1402 in C2 communication.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | StrongPity can identify the IP address of a compromised host.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | StrongPity can exfiltrate collected documents through C2 channels.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique | StrongPity can compress and encrypt archived files into multiple .sft files with a repeated xor encryption scheme.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | StrongPity has named services to appear legitimate.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | StrongPity has used encrypted strings in its dropper component.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | StrongPity has been executed via compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | StrongPity can use HTTP and HTTPS in C2 communications.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | StrongPity can delete previously exfiltrated files from the compromised host.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | StrongPity can identify if ESET or BitDefender antivirus are installed before dropping its payload.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | StrongPity can parse the hard drive on a compromised host to identify specific file extensions.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | StrongPity has a file searcher component that can automatically collect and archive files based on a predefined list of file extensions.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | StrongPity can use PowerShell to add files to the Windows Defender exclusions list.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | StrongPity has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | StrongPity has encrypted C2 traffic using SSL/TLS.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | StrongPity can identify the hard disk volume serial number on a compromised host.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | StrongPity can add directories used by the malware to the Windows Defender exclusions list to prevent detection.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1090.003 | Multi-hop ProxySub-technique | StrongPity can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | StrongPity can download files to specified targets.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | StrongPity can use the |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | StrongPity can determine if a user is logged in by checking to see if explorer.exe is running.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service ExecutionSub-technique | StrongPity can install a service to execute itself as a service.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | StrongPity has been signed with self-signed certificates.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | StrongPity has been bundled with legitimate software installation files for disguise.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0056: PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM is an activity group focused on espionage that has been active since at least 2012. The group has conducted operations globally with a heavy emphasis on Turkish targets. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.[1][2][3]
C0033: C0033
C0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | b28bdee41f6f… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | b28bdee41f6f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020
Tudorica, R. et al. (2020, June 30). StrongPity APT - Revealing Trojanized Tools, Working Hours and Infrastructure. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Talos Promethium June 2020
Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS0491Open source URL
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