LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0184: POWRUNER

POWRUNER is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. [1]

EnterpriseS0184MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

POWRUNER matters because it represents a Windows PowerShell-based command-and-control capability, not just a malware name. For leaders, the practical question is whether the organization can see and control script-driven activity that blends administration, discovery, file transfer, and web or DNS-based communications. The ATT&CK relationships show a broad post-compromise pattern: discovery of users, groups, processes, files, registry, network settings, security tools, plus execution through PowerShell, command shell, WMI, and scheduled tasks.

Executive priority

Prioritize POWRUNER as a validation case for Windows endpoint visibility, PowerShell governance, egress monitoring, and incident response readiness. Because ATT&CK links the software to OilRig and to discovery, execution, persistence, collection, and command-and-control techniques, it is useful for testing whether SOC and IR teams can distinguish legitimate administration from suspicious scripted behavior. It also supports audit and control discussions around script logging, privileged account monitoring, DNS/web egress oversight, and evidence retention.

Technical view

Validate coverage on Windows hosts for PowerShell execution, command shell activity, WMI use, scheduled task creation or modification, registry queries, account and group enumeration, process and file discovery, system and network discovery, screen capture activity, tool transfer, and C2 over web protocols or DNS. Since the official ATT&CK object provides no detection guidance, defenders should build detections from the related techniques rather than from a malware-specific signature alone. Give special attention to correlated sequences: PowerShell or cmd execution followed by discovery commands, security software enumeration, encoded content, outbound web/DNS traffic, or scheduled task persistence.

Likely telemetry

  • PowerShell script block, module, transcription, and process command-line logs where enabled
  • Windows process creation events for powershell, cmd, WMI-related processes, discovery utilities, and scheduled task utilities
  • Windows Task Scheduler operational logs and task registration/change events
  • Registry access/query telemetry from endpoint detection or Windows auditing where available
  • Authentication and directory telemetry for local, domain account, and group enumeration

Detection direction

  • Treat this as behavior-driven detection: correlate PowerShell, cmd, WMI, and scheduled task activity with discovery and outbound communications rather than relying on the POWRUNER name.
  • Baseline legitimate administrative PowerShell and WMI use to reduce false positives, especially for IT operations, endpoint management, and software deployment workflows.
  • Hunt for clustered discovery behavior involving registry, user, group, process, file, system, network configuration, network connection, and security software enumeration.
  • Review outbound web and DNS telemetry for unusual host behavior, encoded data patterns, new destinations, or command-like periodicity, while recognizing that ATT&CK does not provide POWRUNER-specific indicators here.
  • Confirm logging depth: many organizations collect process events but lack PowerShell script content, DNS detail, scheduled task history, or proxy visibility needed to make this behavior actionable.

Mitigation priorities

  • First, ensure PowerShell and Windows command execution are governed with appropriate logging, least privilege, and administrative-use controls.
  • Restrict and monitor WMI and scheduled task administration to expected users, systems, and management channels.
  • Improve egress control and monitoring for web and DNS traffic from Windows endpoints, especially where direct outbound access is not required.
  • Harden identity visibility around local and domain group/account enumeration, with focus on privileged groups and administrative workstations.
  • Maintain endpoint detection coverage and tamper visibility so security software discovery or evasion preparation is more likely to be noticed.
Additional notes and limits

ATT&CK identifies POWRUNER as a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from a C2 server. The object is Windows-scoped and has no official detection text. The strongest defensive value comes from the relationships to ATT&CK techniques, which show the behaviors defenders should validate. ATT&CK also records that OilRig uses this object; that relationship can inform threat intelligence prioritization, but local exposure and relevance still depend on the organization’s environment and threat model.

This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK fields, external references, and relationships. No malware indicators, command syntax, hashes, infrastructure, or official detection logic were provided. Several related techniques list platforms beyond Windows, but the POWRUNER object itself is supplied as Windows, so platform assumptions should remain Windows-focused unless local evidence shows otherwise.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

POWRUNER

POWRUNER is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

20 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

POWRUNER may collect network configuration data by running ipconfig /all on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

POWRUNER can use HTTP for C2 communications.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

POWRUNER may use WMI when collecting information about a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

POWRUNER may collect process information by running tasklist on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

POWRUNER can use DNS for C2 communications.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

POWRUNER may collect information about the currently logged in user by running whoami on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

POWRUNER may collect information on the victim's anti-virus software.[1]

EnterpriseT1069.002Domain GroupsSub-technique

POWRUNER may collect domain group information by running net group /domain or a series of other commands on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1069.001Local GroupsSub-technique

POWRUNER may collect local group information by running net localgroup administrators or a series of other commands on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.002Domain AccountSub-technique

POWRUNER may collect user account information by running net user /domain or a series of other commands on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

POWRUNER may enumerate user directories on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

POWRUNER may collect information about the system by running hostname and systeminfo on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

POWRUNER can execute commands from its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

POWRUNER is written in PowerShell.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

POWRUNER can use base64 encoded C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

POWRUNER can download or upload files from its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

POWRUNER may query the Registry by running reg query on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

POWRUNER may collect active network connections by running netstat -an on a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

POWRUNER persists through a scheduled task that executes it every minute.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

POWRUNER can capture a screenshot from a victim.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.004: DNSEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · GroupG0049: OilRigEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1069.002: Domain GroupsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1069.001: Local GroupsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.002: Domain AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
942ab2f3348ebe6c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundle942ab2f3348e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017

    Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    POWRUNER

    (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)

  6. [6]
    POWRUNER

    (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)

  7. [7]
    POWRUNER

    (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)

  8. [8]
    mitre-attackS0184
    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    mitre-attackS0184
    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackS0184
    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017

    Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017

    Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017

    Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    FireEye APT34 Dec 2017

    Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use