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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0024: Dyre

Dyre is a banking Trojan that has been used for financial gain. [1][2]

EnterpriseS0024MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Dyre is a Windows banking Trojan documented by ATT&CK as malware used for financial gain. Its practical importance is not just malware removal: the mapped behaviors include discovery, persistence through scheduled tasks and Windows services, process/DLL injection, web-based command and control, tool transfer, local staging, and exfiltration over the C2 channel. For leaders, this makes Dyre a useful test case for whether the organization can detect and contain financially motivated endpoint compromise before credentials, banking activity, or sensitive data are abused.

Executive priority

Prioritize Dyre as a control-validation scenario for Windows endpoint resilience, fraud-exposure reduction, SOC readiness, and incident response decision-making. Executives should ask whether endpoint, identity, network, and IR teams can prove visibility into persistence, injected processes, suspicious web communications, local staging, and exfiltration-like behavior. Because ATT&CK links Dyre to financially motivated use and a relationship where Wizard Spider uses this object, it is also relevant to threat intelligence-driven prioritization, but local exposure and current risk must be validated with internal telemetry and business context.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists Dyre as Windows malware with no standalone detection text, so defenders should validate coverage through the related techniques. Focus on Windows scheduled task creation or modification, Windows service creation or modification, process and DLL injection indicators, system/service/user/network/software discovery activity, packed or deobfuscated payload behavior, web-protocol C2 patterns, ingress file transfer, local data staging, and exfiltration over an existing C2 channel. SOC and IR teams should correlate endpoint process telemetry, persistence artifacts, network sessions, and file activity rather than relying on malware-name signatures alone.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry
  • Scheduled Task and Task Scheduler operational events
  • Windows service creation, modification, and registry-backed service configuration changes
  • Endpoint detection telemetry for process injection and DLL injection behavior
  • File creation, modification, packing/unpacking, and deobfuscation-related artifacts

Detection direction

  • Map detections to the related ATT&CK techniques rather than only to the Dyre name, because the object does not provide official detection guidance.
  • Validate Windows persistence detections for Scheduled Task and Windows Service abuse, including both command-line and registry/service-control visibility.
  • Tune discovery detections to reduce administrative false positives by correlating service, user, network, system, and software discovery with suspicious parent processes, new binaries, or unusual execution context.
  • Review behavioral coverage for process injection and DLL injection, recognizing that packed or deobfuscated malware may weaken static signature-only approaches.
  • Inspect web-protocol C2 analytics for suspicious destinations, beacon-like behavior, unusual user agents or paths where available, and endpoint-to-network correlation.

Mitigation priorities

  • Maintain strong Windows endpoint prevention and monitoring for unauthorized scheduled tasks, services, injected processes, and suspicious binaries.
  • Harden administrative controls around service creation, scheduled task management, and privileged execution paths.
  • Ensure egress monitoring and proxy/DNS logging can support investigation of web-protocol command-and-control and exfiltration over C2 channels.
  • Reduce credential and financial-fraud risk with least privilege, strong authentication, and rapid account containment procedures where endpoint compromise is suspected.
  • Prepare IR playbooks that combine host isolation, persistence review, credential-risk assessment, network scoping, and evidence preservation.
Additional notes and limits

The decision value of this object is in the behavior chain expressed by its relationships: discovery, stealth, persistence, command and control, tool transfer, staging, and exfiltration. The official description is brief, and official detection is not provided. Treat Dyre as a scenario for validating layered Windows endpoint and network visibility against financially motivated malware behavior.

This take uses only the supplied ATT&CK/STIX fields, external references, and relationships. It does not assert active exploitation, current prevalence, customer exposure, specific indicators, or guaranteed detection. Platforms are limited to Windows for the malware object, although some related techniques list broader platforms. Local telemetry, asset criticality, identity context, and network architecture are required to determine actual risk and coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Dyre

Dyre is a banking Trojan that has been used for financial gain. [1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Dyre has the ability to identify network settings on a compromised host.[2]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Dyre has the ability to identify the users on a compromised host.[2]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Dyre can detect sandbox analysis environments by inspecting the process list and Registry.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Dyre has the ability to create files in a TEMP folder to act as a database to store information.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Dyre has a command to download and executes additional files.[1]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

Dyre injects into other processes to load modules.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Dyre has the ability to achieve persistence by adding a new task in the task scheduler to run every minute.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Dyre decrypts resources needed for targeting the victim.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Dyre uses HTTPS for C2 communications.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Dyre has the ability to identify the computer name, OS version, and hardware configuration on a compromised host.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Dyre has been delivered with encrypted resources and must be unpacked for execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Dyre has the ability to directly inject its code into the web browser process.[2]

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

Dyre has the ability to identify installed programs on a compromised host.[2]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Dyre registers itself as a service by adding several Registry keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2.[2]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Dyre has the ability to identify running services on a compromised host.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0102: Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1497.001: System ChecksEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.001: Dynamic-link Library InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · GroupG0102: Wizard SpiderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518: Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
ab9ea1fa9c296b90...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundleab9ea1fa9c29…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  2. [2]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Forbes Dyre May 2017

    Brewster, T. (2017, May 4). https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/05/04/dyre-hackers-stealing-millions-from-american-coporates/#601c77842a0a. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    CrowdStrike Wizard Spider March 2019

    Feeley, B. and Stone-Gross, B. (2019, March 20). New Evidence Proves Ongoing WIZARD SPIDER / LUNAR SPIDER Collaboration. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Malwarebytes TrickBot Sep 2019

    Umawing, J. (2019, September 3). TrickBot adds new trick to its arsenal: tampering with trusted texts. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Dyre

    (Citation: Symantec Dyre June 2015)

  7. [7]
    Dyre

    (Citation: Symantec Dyre June 2015)

  8. [8]
    Dyre

    (Citation: Symantec Dyre June 2015)

  9. [9]
    Dyreza

    (Citation: Sophos Dyreza April 2015)

  10. [10]
    Dyreza

    (Citation: Sophos Dyreza April 2015)

  11. [11]
    Dyreza

    (Citation: Sophos Dyreza April 2015)

  12. [12]
    Dyzap

    (Citation: Sophos Dyreza April 2015)

  13. [13]
    Dyzap

    (Citation: Sophos Dyreza April 2015)

  14. [14]
    Dyzap

    (Citation: Sophos Dyreza April 2015)

  15. [15]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Sophos Dyreza April 2015

    Ducklin, P. (2015, April 20). Notes from SophosLabs: Dyreza, the malware that discriminates against old computers. Retrieved June 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Sophos Dyreza April 2015

    Ducklin, P. (2015, April 20). Notes from SophosLabs: Dyreza, the malware that discriminates against old computers. Retrieved June 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Sophos Dyreza April 2015

    Ducklin, P. (2015, April 20). Notes from SophosLabs: Dyreza, the malware that discriminates against old computers. Retrieved June 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  21. [21]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  22. [22]
    mitre-attackS0024
    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    mitre-attackS0024
    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    mitre-attackS0024
    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  32. [32]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  33. [33]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  36. [36]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  37. [37]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  38. [38]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  39. [39]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    CrowdStrike Wizard Spider March 2019

    Feeley, B. and Stone-Gross, B. (2019, March 20). New Evidence Proves Ongoing WIZARD SPIDER / LUNAR SPIDER Collaboration. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Forbes Dyre May 2017

    Brewster, T. (2017, May 4). https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/05/04/dyre-hackers-stealing-millions-from-american-coporates/#601c77842a0a. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Malwarebytes TrickBot Sep 2019

    Umawing, J. (2019, September 3). TrickBot adds new trick to its arsenal: tampering with trusted texts. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  47. [47]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  48. [48]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  51. [51]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  52. [52]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    Symantec Dyre June 2015

    Symantec Security Response. (2015, June 23). Dyre: Emerging threat on financial fraud landscape. Retrieved August 23, 2018.

  60. [60]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  61. [61]
    Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015

    hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
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Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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