G1045: Salt Typhoon
Salt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-backed actor that has been active since at least 2019 and responsible for numerous compromises of network infrastructure at major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers (ISP).[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
G1045: Salt Typhoon describes [Salt Typhoon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1045) is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-backed actor that has been active since at least 2019 and responsible for numerous compromises of network infrastructure at major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers (ISP).(Citation: US Dept. of Treasury Salt Typhoon JAN 2025)(Citation: Cisco Salt Typhoon FEB 2025)
Executive priority
G1045: Salt Typhoon is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G1045: Salt Typhoon by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G1045: Salt Typhoon appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Salt Typhoon
Salt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-backed actor that has been active since at least 2019 and responsible for numerous compromises of network infrastructure at major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers (ISP).[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1685.006 | Clear Linux or Mac System LogsSub-technique | Salt Typhoon has cleared logs including .bash_history, auth.log, lastlog, wtmp, and btmp.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1590.004 | Network TopologySub-technique | Salt Typhoon has used configuration files from exploited network devices to help discover upstream and downstream network segments.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | Salt Typhoon has modified device configurations to create and use Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1587.001 | MalwareSub-technique | Salt Typhoon has used custom tooling including JumbledPath.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolSub-technique | Salt Typhoon has exfiltrated configuration files from exploited network devices over FTP and TFTP.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1098.004 | SSH Authorized KeysSub-technique | Salt Typhoon has added SSH authorized_keys under root or other users at the Linux level on compromised network devices.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1040 | Network Sniffing | Salt Typhoon has used a variety of tools and techniques to capture packet data between network interfaces.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1602.002 | Network Device Configuration DumpSub-technique | Salt Typhoon has attempted to acquire credentials by dumping network device configurations.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1110.002 | Password CrackingSub-technique | Salt Typhoon has cracked passwords for accounts with weak encryption obtained from the configuration files of compromised network devices.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1021.004 | SSHSub-technique | Salt Typhoon has modified the loopback address on compromised switches and used them as the source of SSH connections to additional devices within the target environment, allowing them to bypass access control lists (ACLs).[2] |
| Enterprise | T1686 | Disable or Modify System Firewall | Salt Typhoon has made changes to the Access Control List (ACL) and loopback interface address on compromised devices.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | Salt Typhoon has used publicly available tooling to exploit vulnerabilities.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1136 | Create Account | Salt Typhoon has created Linux-level users on compromised network devices through modification of `/etc/shadow` and `/etc/passwd`.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Salt Typhoon has exploited CVE-2018-0171 in the Smart Install feature of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE software for initial access.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1206: JumbledPath
JumbledPath is a custom-built utility written in GO that has been used by Salt Typhoon since at least 2024 for packet capture on remote Cisco devices. JumbledPath is compiled as an ELF binary using x86-64 architecture which makes it potentially useable across Linux operating systems and network devices from multiple vendors.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 95c7f845f53b… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 5c05e0a01561… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]US Dept. of Treasury Salt Typhoon JAN 2025
US Department of Treasury. (2025, January 17). Treasury Sanctions Company Associated with Salt Typhoon and Hacker Associated with Treasury Compromise. Retrieved February 24, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]Cisco Salt Typhoon FEB 2025
Cisco Talos. (2025, February 20). Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon. Retrieved February 24, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackG1045Open source URL
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