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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1210: Sagerunex

Sagerunex is a malware family exclusively associated with Lotus Blossom operations, with variants existing since at least 2016. Variations of Sagerunex leverage non-traditional command and control mechanisms such as various web services.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1210MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1210: Sagerunex describes [Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) is a malware family exclusively associated with [Lotus Blossom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030) operations, with variants existing since at least 2016. Variations of [Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) leverage non-traditional command and control mechanisms such as various web services.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)

Executive priority

S1210: Sagerunex is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1210: Sagerunex by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1210: Sagerunex appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Sagerunex

Sagerunex is a malware family exclusively associated with Lotus Blossom operations, with variants existing since at least 2016. Variations of Sagerunex leverage non-traditional command and control mechanisms such as various web services.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1090Proxy

Sagerunex uses several proxy configuration settings to ensure connectivity.[2]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Sagerunex encrypts collected system data then exfiltrates via existing command and control channels.[2]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Sagerunex will gather system information such as MAC and IP addresses.[2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Sagerunex communicates via HTTPS, at times using a hard-coded User Agent of `Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Win32)`.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Sagerunex can be passed a reference to an XOR-encrypted configuration file at runtime.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Sagerunex calls the `WaitForSingleObject` API function as part of time-check logic.[2]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

Sagerunex is designed to be dynamic link library (DLL) injected into an infected endpoint and executed directly in memory.[2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Sagerunex identifies the `explorer.exe` process on the executing system.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Sagerunex has used VMProtect to pack and obscure itself.[2]

EnterpriseT1102.003One-Way CommunicationSub-technique

Sagerunex has used web services such as Twitter for command and control purposes.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Sagerunex uses a custom decryption routine to unpack itself during installation.[2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Sagerunex gathers information from the infected system such as hostname.[2]

EnterpriseT1134Access Token Manipulation

Sagerunex finds the `explorer.exe` process after execution and uses it to change the token of its executing thread.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Sagerunex uses HTTPS for command and control communication.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Sagerunex gathers host information and stages it locally as a RAR file prior to exfiltration.[2] Sagerunex stores logged data in an encrypted file located at `%TEMP%/TS_FB56.tmp` during execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

Sagerunex uses a "servicemain" function to verify its environment to ensure it can only be executed as a service, as well as the existence of a configuration file in a specified directory.[2]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

Sagerunex has archived collected materials in RAR format.[2]

EnterpriseT1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique

Sagerunex has used virtual private servers (VPS) for command and control traffic as well as third-party cloud services in more recent variants.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0030: Lotus BlossomEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090: ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.001: Dynamic-link Library InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102.003: One-Way CommunicationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1134: Access Token ManipulationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480: Execution GuardrailsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.001: Archive via UtilityEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102.002: Bidirectional CommunicationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
627020cf9b5bda0e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle627020cf9b5b…
19.11.0Older bundle627020cf9b5b…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS1210
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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