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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1059.008: Network Device CLI

Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.

Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or SSH.

Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.008Sub-techniqueObject v1.2Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Network Device CLI abuse matters because routers, switches, and security appliances often sit in the path of critical business traffic. If an adversary can execute commands through a device CLI or supported scripting interpreter, they may change device behavior, alter traffic flows, modify startup configuration, or disable logging and security features. For leaders, this is not just an endpoint execution issue; it is a resilience, visibility, and change-control issue for the infrastructure that carries the business.

Executive priority

Prioritize this technique where network devices support remote administration or scripting and where outages, traffic manipulation, or loss of logging would materially affect operations. Executives should ask whether privileged access to network devices is governed with the same rigor as servers and cloud consoles, whether command history and configuration evidence are retained for incident response and audit, and whether the SOC can distinguish approved network administration from suspicious CLI activity. ATT&CK relationship context also shows relevance to network-device malware and campaigns, including infrastructure-impacting scenarios, so coverage should be considered in business continuity and cyber-physical risk planning where network devices support operational environments.

Technical view

For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate visibility around execution through network device CLIs on the Network Devices platform under the Execution tactic. Official ATT&CK detection text is not provided, but the object references CLI access through direct console, telnet, and SSH, and the relationship context includes DET0142, Behavioral Detection of CLI Abuse on Network Devices. Practical validation should focus on command history, administrative authentication, privilege level changes, configuration changes, startup configuration modifications, traffic-flow changes, and events indicating logging or security features were disabled. Treat this as a command-and-scripting-interpreter problem specialized to network operating systems and appliances, not only as traditional host shell monitoring.

Likely telemetry

  • Network device command history where available
  • AAA, authentication, authorization, and accounting records for network device administration
  • SSH, telnet, and direct console access logs
  • Privilege level changes and administrative role usage
  • Running and startup configuration change records

Detection direction

  • Map DET0142-style behavioral detection to local network device families and management workflows rather than relying on a generic endpoint command-line model.
  • Baseline normal administrative commands, maintenance windows, source locations, and privileged users so unusual CLI activity can be investigated without overwhelming analysts with routine operations.
  • Correlate CLI commands with authentication events, privilege escalation, configuration diffs, and change-management records.
  • Pay special attention to commands or sequences that modify startup configuration, manipulate traffic flows, disable logging, or change security features, because these behaviors are explicitly described by ATT&CK for this technique.
  • Validate whether command history is actually retained and centrally collected; many environments assume network-device visibility exists when it is incomplete, local-only, or overwritten.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with User Account Management: ensure network device accounts have defined owners, lifecycle controls, timely deactivation, and appropriate access scope.
  • Strengthen Privileged Account Management: restrict administrative roles, enforce least privilege, and ensure privileged actions are attributable and logged.
  • Limit management access paths to approved methods and administrators; the ATT&CK object specifically notes console, telnet, and SSH as CLI access routes.
  • Where supported by the device or network OS, apply Execution Prevention concepts to restrict unauthorized scripts, interpreters, or code execution paths.
  • Pair technical controls with configuration backup, command logging, and change review so responders can determine what changed and restore trusted device behavior.
Additional notes and limits

This take is based on ATT&CK T1059.008 Network Device CLI, its official description, external references, and supplied relationships. Relationship context includes mitigation mappings to User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and Execution Prevention; a detection strategy named Behavioral Detection of CLI Abuse on Network Devices; parent technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; and campaign/software relationships involving network-device activity. These relationships support prioritizing identity governance, privileged access, command telemetry, and configuration integrity for network infrastructure.

Official ATT&CK detection guidance for this sub-technique is not provided in the supplied object. Specific commands, device vendors, log fields, and detection logic must be validated against the organization’s actual network devices, operating systems, management protocols, and logging architecture. The supplied relationships indicate that campaigns and software use this technique, but they do not by themselves establish local exposure, active exploitation, or guaranteed detection coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Network Device CLI

Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.

Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or SSH.

Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting InterpreterThis object subtechnique of Command and Scripting Interpreter.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S9013: DRYHOOK

DRYHOOK is Python script used to steal credentials. DRYHOOK was first reported in January 2025, and has previously been leveraged by People's Republic of China (PRC) state-affiliated threat actors identified as UNC5221 and SYLVANITE.[1][2][3]

LinuxNetwork Devices
MalwareEnterprise

S9014: PHASEJAM

PHASEJAM is a dropper written as a bash shell script that modifies Ivanti Connect Secure appliance components. PHASEJAM was first reported in January 2025. PHASEJAM has previously been leveraged by People's Republic of China (PRC)- affiliated actors identified as UNC5221 and SYLVANITE.[1][2]

LinuxNetwork Devices
CampaignEnterprise

C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]

CampaignEnterprise

C0056: RedPenguin

The RedPenguin project was launched by Juniper in July 2024 to investigate reported malware infections of Juniper MX Series routers. RedPenguin activity was separately attributed to UNC3886 and included the deployment of multiple custom versions of the publicly-available TINYSHELL backdoor on Juniper routers.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
be5f65d971e01461...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundlebe5f65d971e0…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cisco Synful Knock Evolution

    Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    CERT Polska

    CERT Polska. (2026, January 30). Energy Sector Incident Report – 29 December. Retrieved April 22, 2026.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Mandiant UNC3886 Juniper Routers MAR 2025

    Lamparski, L. et al. (2025, March 11). Ghost in the Router: China-Nexus Espionage Actor UNC3886 Targets Juniper Routers. Retrieved June 24, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Juniper RedPenguin MAR 2025

    Juniper Networks, Cybersecurity R&D. (2025, March 11). The RedPenguin Malware Incident. Retrieved June 24, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025

    John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, Matt Lin, Daniel Ainsworth, Robert Wallace, Dimiter Andonov, Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Jacob Thompson. (2025, January 8). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved April 14, 2026.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025

    Sila Ozeren Hacioglu. (2025, May 5). UNC5221’s Latest Exploit: Weaponizing CVE-2025-22457 in Ivanti Connect Secure. Retrieved April 13, 2026.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024

    Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024

    Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. (2024, April 24). Cyber Activity Impacting CISCO ASA VPNs. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - AAA

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - AAA. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Cisco Synful Knock Evolution

    Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Cisco Synful Knock Evolution

    Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    mitre-attackT1059.008
    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    mitre-attackT1059.008
    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    mitre-attackT1059.008
    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    CERT Polska

    CERT Polska. (2026, January 30). Energy Sector Incident Report – 29 December. Retrieved April 22, 2026.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Juniper RedPenguin MAR 2025

    Juniper Networks, Cybersecurity R&D. (2025, March 11). The RedPenguin Malware Incident. Retrieved June 24, 2025.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Mandiant UNC3886 Juniper Routers MAR 2025

    Lamparski, L. et al. (2025, March 11). Ghost in the Router: China-Nexus Espionage Actor UNC3886 Targets Juniper Routers. Retrieved June 24, 2025.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025

    John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, Matt Lin, Daniel Ainsworth, Robert Wallace, Dimiter Andonov, Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Jacob Thompson. (2025, January 8). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved April 14, 2026.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025

    Sila Ozeren Hacioglu. (2025, May 5). UNC5221’s Latest Exploit: Weaponizing CVE-2025-22457 in Ivanti Connect Secure. Retrieved April 13, 2026.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024

    Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. (2024, April 24). Cyber Activity Impacting CISCO ASA VPNs. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024

    Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025

    John Wolfram, Josh Murchie, Matt Lin, Daniel Ainsworth, Robert Wallace, Dimiter Andonov, Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Jacob Thompson. (2025, January 8). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Targeted in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved April 14, 2026.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - AAA

    Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - AAA. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.