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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0030: Lotus Blossom

Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0030GroupObject v4.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Lotus Blossom matters because ATT&CK describes it as a long-standing group targeting entities in Asia since at least 2009, including government-related organizations and digital certificate issuers. For leaders, the practical issue is not only malware names; it is whether the organization can recognize post-compromise discovery, Windows administration tool abuse, internal reconnaissance, proxying, registry changes, and data staging before an incident becomes a broader operational or trust problem.

Executive priority

Prioritize this object where the business has exposure to Asia-based operations, government-adjacent work, certificate or trust services, or environments where Windows identity and endpoint telemetry are critical to resilience. Ask whether SOC and IR teams can prove visibility into Active Directory enumeration, WMI execution, registry modification, internal network mapping, and unusual command-and-control proxy behavior. This is also useful for audit and readiness discussions because many related behaviors rely on legitimate administrative utilities, making control evidence and logging quality more important than malware-only prevention.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text and no group-level platform list, but the relationships point defenders toward Windows-heavy tradecraft and discovery-focused activity. Related software includes Elise, Emissary, Sagerunex, and Hannotog, plus common or dual-use tools such as ping, certutil, Impacket, AdFind, and NBTscan. Related techniques include registry query and modification, WMI execution, account and network discovery, remote system and service discovery, local data staging, access token manipulation, and internal or multi-hop proxying. SOC validation should therefore focus on behavior chains: enumeration followed by administrative execution, registry changes, staging activity, and network egress or proxy patterns, rather than relying only on static indicators or malware family names.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation with command line arguments for WMI, certutil, ping, AdFind-like LDAP queries, NBTscan-like activity, and other administrative utilities
  • Windows Registry auditing or EDR telemetry for registry queries and modifications
  • Windows event logs and EDR events related to WMI execution and remote administrative activity
  • Active Directory, LDAP, and domain controller logs showing account, group, and directory enumeration
  • Network flow, DNS, proxy, firewall, and web gateway logs for internal reconnaissance, unusual egress, and proxy or multi-hop patterns

Detection direction

  • Validate detections for sequences of discovery commands across hosts, not just single commands that may be common in administration.
  • Tune allowlists carefully for legitimate IT use of WMI, certutil, ping, AdFind, Impacket, and scanning utilities; false positives are likely without user, host role, time, and change-ticket context.
  • Correlate registry modification with process lineage, account context, and persistence or defense-impairment hypotheses rather than treating every registry change as malicious.
  • Monitor Active Directory enumeration from unusual workstations, service accounts, or newly accessed hosts, especially when followed by remote execution or internal network mapping.
  • Look for internal proxy behavior and unusual east-west traffic paths; source attribution may be obscured by multi-hop proxying, so preserve network flow and proxy logs long enough for IR reconstruction.

Mitigation priorities

  • Establish baseline logging first: endpoint process telemetry, WMI events, registry visibility, AD query visibility, and network flow/proxy records.
  • Reduce unnecessary administrative tool exposure and monitor sanctioned use of dual-use utilities rather than attempting blanket blocking that may disrupt operations.
  • Harden identity and administrative access paths with least privilege, privileged account monitoring, and review of service account use, especially around WMI and directory enumeration.
  • Segment sensitive systems and certificate or trust-service infrastructure so discovery and internal proxying are more detectable and less useful to an intruder.
  • Prepare IR playbooks for discovery-heavy intrusions: scope account enumeration, remote execution, registry changes, local staging, and internal proxy routes before containment decisions.
Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK data supports a conservative readiness-focused take: Lotus Blossom is long-running, has multiple aliases, has targeted Asia-based entities and digital certificate issuers, and is linked to several malware families and dual-use tools. The strongest defensive value is validating coverage for the related techniques and software, especially Windows endpoint, identity, directory, and network telemetry.

The group object has no official ATT&CK detection text, no specified group-level platforms or tactics, and the relationship descriptions are partial. Local exposure, active targeting, malware presence, and detection coverage cannot be inferred from this object alone; organizations need their own telemetry, asset context, and intelligence requirements to prioritize response.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Lotus Blossom

Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `ipconfig` and `netstat` to gather network information on compromised hosts.[3]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Lotus Blossom has configured tools such as Sagerunex to run as Windows services.[3]

EnterpriseT1087.002Domain AccountSub-technique

Lotus Blossom has used `net` commands and tools such as AdFind to profile domain accounts associated with victim machines and make Active Directory queries.[3][2]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

Lotus Blossom has locally staged compressed and archived data for follow-on exfiltration.[3]

EnterpriseT1134Access Token Manipulation

Lotus Blossom has retrieved process tokens for processes to adjust the privileges of the launch process or other items.[3]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `net` to profile local system users.[3]

EnterpriseT1090.001Internal ProxySub-technique

Lotus Blossom has used publicly available tools such as the Venom proxy tool to proxy traffic out of victim environments.[3]

EnterpriseT1539Steal Web Session Cookie

Lotus Blossom has used publicly-available tools to steal cookies from browsers such as Chrome.[3]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Lotus Blossom has installed tools such as Sagerunex by writing them to the Windows registry.[3]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `netstat` to identify system network connections.[3]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Lotus Blossom has used WMI to enable lateral movement.[3]

EnterpriseT1482Domain Trust Discovery

Lotus Blossom has used tools such as AdFind to make Active Directory queries.[2]

EnterpriseT1016.001Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique

Lotus Blossom has performed checks to determine if a victim machine is able to access the Internet.[3]

EnterpriseT1090.003Multi-hop ProxySub-technique

Lotus Blossom has used tools such as the publicly available HTran tool for proxying traffic in victim environments.[3]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

Lotus Blossom has used publicly-available tools such as a Python-based cookie stealer for Chrome browsers, Impacket, and the Venom proxy tool.[3]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Lotus Blossom has used Ping to identify remote systems.[2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `dir` to examine the local filesystem of victim machines.[3]

EnterpriseT1560.003Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique

Lotus Blossom has used custom tools to compress and archive data on victim systems.[3]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

Lotus Blossom has used WinRAR for compressing data in RAR format.[3][2]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

Lotus Blossom has used port scanners to enumerate services on remote hosts.[2]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Lotus Blossom has run commands such as `reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[service name]\Parameters` to verify if installed implants are running as a service.[3]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

ToolEnterprise

S0097: Ping

Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. [1]

ToolEnterprise

S0357: Impacket

Impacket is an open source collection of modules written in Python for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. Impacket contains several tools for remote service execution, Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S0081: Elise

Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of tools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.[1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0160: certutil

certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · ToolS0552: AdFindEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.002: Domain AccountEnterpriseuses · ToolS0097: PingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1134: Access Token ManipulationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · ToolS0357: ImpacketEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.001: Internal ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1539: Steal Web Session CookieEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0082: EmissaryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1482: Domain Trust DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0081: EliseEnterpriseuses · MalwareS1211: HannotogEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016.001: Internet Connection DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090.003: Multi-hop ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · ToolS0590: NBTscanEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
4.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4b877ae53b8cbeee...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.14.0Current bundle4b877ae53b8c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lotus Blossom Jun 2015

    Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Lotus Blossom Dec 2015

    Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2015, December 18). Attack on French Diplomat Linked to Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

  5. [5]
    Emissary Trojan Feb 2016

    Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

  6. [6]
    Spring Dragon Jun 2015

    Baumgartner, K.. (2015, June 17). The Spring Dragon APT. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Bilbug

    (Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)

  11. [11]
    Bilbug

    (Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)

  12. [12]
    Bilbug

    (Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)

  13. [13]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    DRAGONFISH

    (Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  16. [16]
    DRAGONFISH

    (Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  17. [17]
    DRAGONFISH

    (Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  18. [18]
    Lotus Blossom

    (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  19. [19]
    Lotus Blossom

    (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  20. [20]
    Lotus Blossom

    (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  21. [21]
    Lotus Blossom Jun 2015

    Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Lotus Blossom Jun 2015

    Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    RADIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  27. [27]
    RADIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  28. [28]
    RADIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  29. [29]
    Raspberry Typhoon

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  30. [30]
    Raspberry Typhoon

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  31. [31]
    Raspberry Typhoon

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  32. [32]
    Spring Dragon

    (Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015)(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  33. [33]
    Spring Dragon

    (Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015)(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  34. [34]
    Spring Dragon

    (Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015)(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)

  35. [35]
    Spring Dragon Jun 2015

    Baumgartner, K.. (2015, June 17). The Spring Dragon APT. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Spring Dragon Jun 2015

    Baumgartner, K.. (2015, June 17). The Spring Dragon APT. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Thrip

    (Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)

  40. [40]
    Thrip

    (Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)

  41. [41]
    Thrip

    (Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)

  42. [42]
    mitre-attackG0030
    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    mitre-attackG0030
    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    mitre-attackG0030
    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

    Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Emissary Trojan Feb 2016

    Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

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    Lotus Blossom Dec 2015

    Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2015, December 18). Attack on French Diplomat Linked to Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

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    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Symantec Bilbug 2022

    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018

    Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
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    Baumgartner, K.. (2015, June 17). The Spring Dragon APT. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

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    Baumgartner, K.. (2015, June 17). The Spring Dragon APT. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

    Open source URL
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    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
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    Cisco LotusBlossom 2025

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    Open source URL
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