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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1145: Pikabot

Pikabot is a backdoor used for initial access and follow-on tool deployment active since early 2023. Pikabot is notable for extensive use of multiple encoding, encryption, and defense evasion mechanisms to evade defenses and avoid analysis. Pikabot has some overlaps with QakBot, but insufficient evidence exists to definitively link these two malware families. Pikabot is frequently used to deploy follow on tools such as Cobalt Strike or ransomware variants.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS1145MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1145: Pikabot describes [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) is a backdoor used for initial access and follow-on tool deployment active since early 2023. [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) is notable for extensive use of multiple encoding, encryption, and defense evasion mechanisms to evade defenses and avoid analysis. [Pikabot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1145) has some overlaps with [QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650), but insufficient evidence exists to definitively link these two malw...

Executive priority

S1145: Pikabot is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1145: Pikabot by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1145: Pikabot appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Pikabot

Pikabot is a backdoor used for initial access and follow-on tool deployment active since early 2023. Pikabot is notable for extensive use of multiple encoding, encryption, and defense evasion mechanisms to evade defenses and avoid analysis. Pikabot has some overlaps with QakBot, but insufficient evidence exists to definitively link these two malware families. Pikabot is frequently used to deploy follow on tools such as Cobalt Strike or ransomware variants.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Pikabot gathers victim network information through commands such as ipconfig and ipconfig /all.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Pikabot can execute Windows shell commands via cmd.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1482Domain Trust Discovery

Pikabot will gather information concerning the Windows Domain the victim machine is a member of during execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1055.003Thread Execution HijackingSub-technique

Pikabot can create a suspended instance of a legitimate process (e.g., ctfmon.exe), allocate memory within the suspended process corresponding to Pikabot's core module, then redirect execution flow via `SetContextThread` API so that when the thread resumes the Pikabot core module is executed.[2]

EnterpriseT1622Debugger Evasion

Pikabot features several methods to evade debugging by analysts, including checks for active debuggers, the use of breakpoints during execution, and checking various system information items such as system memory and the number of processors.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseT1571Non-Standard Port

Pikabot uses non-standard ports, such as 2967, 2223, and others, for HTTPS command and control communication.[2]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Earlier Pikabot variants use a custom encryption procedure leveraging multiple mechanisms including AES with multiple rounds of Base64 encoding for its command and control communication.[1] Later Pikabot variants eliminate the use of AES and instead use RC4 encryption for transmitted information.[2]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

During the initial Pikabot command and control check-in, Pikabot will transmit collected system information encrypted using RC4.[2]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

Pikabot will retrieve the name of the user associated with the thread under which the malware is executing.[2]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Pikabot uses native Windows APIs to determine if the process is being debugged and analyzed, such as `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`, `NtQueryInformationProcess`, `ProcessDebugPort`, and `ProcessDebugFlags`.[1] Other Pikabot variants populate a global list of Windows API addresses from the `NTDLL` and `KERNEL32` libraries, and references these items instead of calling the API items to obfuscate execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Pikabot performs a variety of system checks and gathers system information, including commands such as whoami.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-technique

Some versions of Pikabot build the final PE payload in memory to avoid writing contents to disk on the executing machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.003SteganographySub-technique

Pikabot loads a set of PNG images stored in the malware's resources section (RCDATA), each with an encrypted section containing portions of the core Pikabot core module. These sections are loaded and decrypted using a bitwise XOR operation with a hardcoded 32 bit key.[1]

EnterpriseT1620Reflective Code Loading

Pikabot reflectively loads stored, previously encrypted components of the PE file into memory of the currently executing process to avoid writing content to disk on the executing machine.[2]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Pikabot uses base64 encoding in conjunction with symmetric encryption mechanisms to obfuscate command and control communications.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Pikabot decrypts command and control URIs using ADVobfuscator, and decrypts IP addresses and port numbers with a custom algorithm.[1] Other versions of Pikabot decode chunks of stored stage 2 payload content in the initial payload .text section before consolidating them for further execution.[2] Overall LunarMail is associated with multiple encoding and encryption mechanisms to obfuscate the malware's presence and avoid analysis or detection.[3]

EnterpriseT1027.009Embedded PayloadsSub-technique

Pikabot further decrypts information embedded via steganography using AES-CBC with the same 32 bit key as initial XOR operations combined with the first 16 bytes of the encrypted data as an initialization vector.[1] Other Pikabot variants include encrypted, chunked sections of the stage 2 payload in the initial loader .text section before decrypting and assembling these during execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1055.002Portable Executable InjectionSub-technique

Pikabot, following payload decryption, creates a process hard-coded into the dropped (e.g., WerFault.exe) and injects the decrypted core modules into it.[1]

EnterpriseT1480.001Environmental KeyingSub-technique

Pikabot stops execution if the infected system language matches one of several languages, with various versions referencing: Georgian, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, and Slovenian.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Pikabot maintains persistence following system checks through the Run key in the registry.[1]

EnterpriseT1497.001System ChecksSub-technique

Pikabot performs a variety of system checks to determine if it is running in an analysis environment or sandbox, such as checking the number of processors (must be greater than two), and the amount of RAM (must be greater than 2GB).[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

CampaignEnterprise

C0037: Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution

Pikabot was distributed in Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution throughout 2023 by an entity linked to BlackBasta ransomware deployment via email attachments. This activity followed the take-down of QakBot, with several technical overlaps and similarities with QakBot, indicating a possible connection. The identified activity led to the deployment of tools such as Cobalt Strike, while coinciding with campaigns delivering DarkGate and IcedID en route to ransomware deployment.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
387229b95e8b555c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle387229b95e8b…
19.11.0Older bundle387229b95e8b…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Zscaler Pikabot 2023

    Brett Stone-Gross & Nikolaos Pantazopoulos. (2023, May 24). Technical Analysis of Pikabot. Retrieved July 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Elastic Pikabot 2024

    Daniel Stepanic & Salim Bitam. (2024, February 23). PIKABOT, I choose you!. Retrieved July 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Logpoint Pikabot 2024

    Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel. (2024, February). Pikabot: 
 A Sophisticated and Modular Backdoor Trojan with Advanced Evasion Techniques. Retrieved July 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS1145
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.