S0012: PoisonIvy
Security context for executives and security teams
S0012: PoisonIvy describes [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)
Executive priority
S0012: PoisonIvy is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0012: PoisonIvy by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0012: PoisonIvy appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
PoisonIvy
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1547.014 | Active SetupSub-technique | PoisonIvy creates a Registry key in the Active Setup pointing to a malicious executable.CitationMicrosoft PoisonIvy 2017Citationpaloalto Tropic Trooper 2016CitationFireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov |
| Enterprise | T1480.002 | Mutual ExclusionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | |
| Enterprise | T1010 | Application Window Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0066: Elderwood
Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. [1] The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. [2] [3]
G0093: GALLIUM
GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers.[1] Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.[1][2][3]
G0018: admin@338
admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. [1]
G0045: menuPass
menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]
menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]
G0002: Moafee
G0129: Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
G0081: Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]
G0006: APT1
G0001: Axiom
Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]
G1023: APT5
APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
G0021: Molerats
G0136: IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.[1][2][3]
S0209: Darkmoon
Official MITRE ATT&CK object mirrored from source data.
C0016: Operation Dust Storm
Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]
Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.2 | Current bundle | 4ed53268fb33… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.2 | Older bundle | 4ed53268fb33… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FireEye Poison Ivy
FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012
O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005
Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]Novetta-Axiom
Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
Open source URL - [5]Breut
(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)
- [6]Darkmoon
(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)
- [7]Poison Ivy
(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)
- [8]PoisonIvy
(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)
- [9]Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014
Payet, L. (2014, September 19). Life on Mars: How attackers took advantage of hope for alien existance in new Darkmoon campaign. Retrieved September 13, 2018.
Open source URL - [10]mitre-attackS0012Open source URL
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