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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0012: PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0012MalwareObject v2.2Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0012: PoisonIvy describes [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)

Executive priority

S0012: PoisonIvy is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0012: PoisonIvy by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0012: PoisonIvy appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service. PoisonIvy also creates a Registry entry modifying the Logical Disk Manager service to point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[3]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new system device.[3]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

PoisonIvy creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.[3]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

PoisonIvy hides any strings related to its own indicators of compromise.[3]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

PoisonIvy contains a keylogger.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1547.014Active SetupSub-technique

PoisonIvy creates a Registry key in the Active Setup pointing to a malicious executable.CitationMicrosoft PoisonIvy 2017Citationpaloalto Tropic Trooper 2016CitationFireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov

EnterpriseT1480.002Mutual ExclusionSub-technique

PoisonIvy creates a mutex using either a custom or default value.[1]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

PoisonIvy can inject a malicious DLL into a process.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

PoisonIvy stages collected data in a text file.[3]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

PoisonIvy creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can open a command-line interface.[3]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

PoisonIvy creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can upload files.[3]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

PoisonIvy uses the Camellia cipher to encrypt communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

PoisonIvy creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can steal system information.[3]

EnterpriseT1010Application Window Discovery

PoisonIvy captures window titles.[3]

EnterpriseT1014Rootkit

PoisonIvy starts a rootkit from a malicious file dropped to disk.[3]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0066: Elderwood

Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. [1] The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. [2] [3]

GroupEnterprise

G0093: GALLIUM

GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers.[1] Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0018: admin@338

admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G0045: menuPass

menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]

menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G0002: Moafee

Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

GroupEnterprise

G0081: Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0006: APT1

APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G0001: Axiom

Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G1023: APT5

APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

GroupEnterprise

G0021: Molerats

Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[1][2][3][4]

MalwareEnterprise

S0209: Darkmoon

Official MITRE ATT&CK object mirrored from source data.

Revoked/deprecated
CampaignEnterprise

C0016: Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4ed53268fb335bb5...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.2Current bundle4ed53268fb33…
19.12.2Older bundle4ed53268fb33…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye Poison Ivy

    FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved September 19, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012

    O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005

    Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Novetta-Axiom

    Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Breut

    (Citation: Novetta-Axiom)

  6. [6]
    Darkmoon

    (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)

  7. [7]
    Poison Ivy

    (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)

  8. [8]
    PoisonIvy

    (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014)

  9. [9]
    Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014

    Payet, L. (2014, September 19). Life on Mars: How attackers took advantage of hope for alien existance in new Darkmoon campaign. Retrieved September 13, 2018.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackS0012
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.