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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1582: SMS Control

Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects.

This can be accomplished by requesting the `RECEIVE_SMS` or `SEND_SMS` permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the `SMS_DELIVER` broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.[1][2]

MobileT1582TechniqueObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1582: SMS Control describes Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects. This can be accomplished by requesting the `RECEIVE_SMS` or `SEND_SMS` permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the `SMS_DELIVER` broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the m...

Executive priority

T1582: SMS Control is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1582: SMS Control by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (impact), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1582: SMS Control appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SMS Control

Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects.

This can be accomplished by requesting the `RECEIVE_SMS` or `SEND_SMS` permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the `SMS_DELIVER` broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareMobile

S0480: Cerberus

Cerberus is a banking trojan whose usage can be rented on underground forums and marketplaces. Prior to being available to rent, the authors of Cerberus claim was used in private operations for two years.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0411: Rotexy

Rotexy is an Android banking malware that has evolved over several years. It was originally an SMS spyware Trojan first spotted in October 2014, and since then has evolved to contain more features, including ransomware functionality.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0328: Stealth Mango

Stealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer. [1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0551: GoldenEagle

GoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.[1]

MalwareMobile

S0427: TrickMo

TrickMo a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by TrickBot. TrickMo has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.[1]

TrickMo is designed to steal transaction authorization numbers (TANs), which are typically used as one-time passwords.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1095: AhRat

AhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, “iRecorder – Screen Recorder,” which itself was released in September 2021.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0301: Dendroid

Dendroid is an Android remote access tool (RAT) primarily targeting Western countries. The RAT was available for purchase for $300 and came bundled with a utility to inject the RAT into legitimate applications.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0425: Corona Updates

Corona Updates is Android spyware that took advantage of the Coronavirus pandemic. The campaign distributing this spyware is tracked as Project Spy. Multiple variants of this spyware have been discovered to have been hosted on the Google Play Store.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1062: S.O.V.A.

S.O.V.A. is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. S.O.V.A., which is Russian for "owl", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.[1][2]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0485: Mandrake

Mandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.

Mandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1185: LightSpy

First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.[1]

AndroidWindowsiOS
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
52dba4cc70722ef7...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle52dba4cc7072…
19.11.1Older bundle52dba4cc7072…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SMS KitKat

    S.Main, D. Braun. (2013, October 14). Getting Your SMS Apps Ready for KitKat. Retrieved September 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Android SmsProvider

    Google. (n.d.). SmsProvider.java. Retrieved September 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-16
    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueCEL-41
    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackT1582
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.