S0505: Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. Desert Scorpion is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor APT-C-23.[1]
There are multiple close variants of Desert Scorpion, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], FrozenCell and SpyC23, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.
Security context for executives and security teams
S0505: Desert Scorpion describes [Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505) is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. [Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505) is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor [APT-C-23](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1028).(Citation: Lookout Desert Scorpion) There are multiple close variants of [Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505), such as VAMP(Citation: Unit42 VAMP 2017), GnatSpy(Citation: Tr...
Executive priority
S0505: Desert Scorpion is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0505: Desert Scorpion by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0505: Desert Scorpion appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. Desert Scorpion is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor APT-C-23.[1]
There are multiple close variants of Desert Scorpion, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], FrozenCell and SpyC23, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1532 | Archive Collected Data | Desert Scorpion can encrypt exfiltrated data.[1] |
| Mobile | T1644 | Out of Band Data | Desert Scorpion can be controlled using SMS messages.[1] |
| Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime | Desert Scorpion has been distributed in multiple stages.[1] |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | Desert Scorpion can obtain a list of installed applications.[1] |
| Mobile | T1420 | File and Directory Discovery | Desert Scorpion can list files stored on external storage.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | Desert Scorpion can retrieve SMS messages.[1] |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | Desert Scorpion can record audio from phone calls and the device microphone.[1] |
| Mobile | T1426 | System Information Discovery | Desert Scorpion can collect device metadata and can check if the device is rooted.[1] |
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System | Desert Scorpion can collect attacker-specified files, including files located on external storage.[1] |
| Mobile | T1512 | Video Capture | Desert Scorpion can record videos.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.003 | Contact ListSub-technique | Desert Scorpion can collect the device’s contact list.[1] |
| Mobile | T1630.002 | File DeletionSub-technique | Desert Scorpion can delete copies of itself if additional APKs are downloaded to external storage.[1] |
| Mobile | T1409 | Stored Application Data | Desert Scorpion can collect account information stored on the device.[1] |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | Desert Scorpion can track the device’s location.[1] |
| Mobile | T1632.001 | Code Signing Policy ModificationSub-technique | If running on a Huawei device, Desert Scorpion adds itself to the protected apps list, which allows it to run with the screen off.[1] |
| Mobile | T1628.001 | Suppress Application IconSub-technique | Desert Scorpion can hide its icon.[1] |
| Mobile | T1582 | SMS Control | Desert Scorpion can send SMS messages.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.2 | Current bundle | b04d2d4b878c… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Older bundle | b04d2d4b878c… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | b04d2d4b878c… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Lookout Desert Scorpion
A. Blaich, M. Flossman. (2018, April 16). Lookout finds new surveillanceware in Google Play with ties to known threat actor targeting the Middle East. Retrieved September 11, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Unit42 VAMP 2017
Bar, T., Lancaster, T. (2017, April 5). Targeted Attacks in the Middle East Using KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA. Retrieved March 4, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Trendmicro GnatSpy 2017
Guo, G., Xu, E. (2017, December 18). New GnatSpy Mobile Malware Family Discovered. Retrieved March 4, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS0505Open source URL
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