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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0505: Desert Scorpion

MITRE ATT&CK S0505: Desert Scorpion Malware details for Android, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.

MobileS0505MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0505: Desert Scorpion describes [Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505) is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. [Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505) is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor [APT-C-23](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1028).(Citation: Lookout Desert Scorpion) There are multiple close variants of [Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505), such as VAMP(Citation: Unit42 VAMP 2017), GnatSpy(Citation: Tr...

Executive priority

S0505: Desert Scorpion is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0505: Desert Scorpion by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0505: Desert Scorpion appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Desert Scorpion

No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1532Archive Collected DataThis object uses Archive Collected Data.
MobileT1644Out of Band DataThis object uses Out of Band Data.
MobileT1407Download New Code at RuntimeThis object uses Download New Code at Runtime.
MobileT1418Software DiscoveryThis object uses Software Discovery.
MobileT1420File and Directory DiscoveryThis object uses File and Directory Discovery.
MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-techniqueThis object uses SMS Messages.
MobileT1429Audio CaptureThis object uses Audio Capture.
MobileT1426System Information DiscoveryThis object uses System Information Discovery.
MobileT1533Data from Local SystemThis object uses Data from Local System.
MobileT1512Video CaptureThis object uses Video Capture.
MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-techniqueThis object uses Contact List.
MobileT1630.002File DeletionSub-techniqueThis object uses File Deletion.
MobileT1409Stored Application DataThis object uses Stored Application Data.
MobileT1430Location TrackingThis object uses Location Tracking.
MobileT1632.001Code Signing Policy ModificationSub-techniqueThis object uses Code Signing Policy Modification.
MobileT1628.001Suppress Application IconSub-techniqueThis object uses Suppress Application Icon.
MobileT1582SMS ControlThis object uses SMS Control.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupMobile

G1028: APT-C-23

APT-C-23 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[1] APT-C-23 has primarily focused its operations on the Middle East, including Israeli military assets. APT-C-23 has developed mobile spyware targeting Android and iOS devices since 2017.[2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG1028: APT-C-23Mobileuses · TechniqueT1532: Archive Collected DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1644: Out of Band DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1407: Download New Code at RuntimeMobileuses · TechniqueT1418: Software DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1420: File and Directory DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1426: System Information DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1630.002: File DeletionMobileuses · TechniqueT1409: Stored Application DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1632.001: Code Signing Policy ModificationMobileuses · TechniqueT1628.001: Suppress Application IconMobileuses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b04d2d4b878c00db...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundleb04d2d4b878c…
19.11.2Older bundleb04d2d4b878c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lookout Desert Scorpion

    A. Blaich, M. Flossman. (2018, April 16). Lookout finds new surveillanceware in Google Play with ties to known threat actor targeting the Middle East. Retrieved September 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Unit42 VAMP 2017

    Bar, T., Lancaster, T. (2017, April 5). Targeted Attacks in the Middle East Using KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA. Retrieved March 4, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Trendmicro GnatSpy 2017

    Guo, G., Xu, E. (2017, December 18). New GnatSpy Mobile Malware Family Discovered. Retrieved March 4, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0505
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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