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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0540: Asacub

Asacub is a banking trojan that attempts to steal money from victims’ bank accounts. It attempts to do this by initiating a wire transfer via SMS message from compromised devices.[1]

MobileS0540MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0540: Asacub describes [Asacub](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0540) is a banking trojan that attempts to steal money from victims’ bank accounts. It attempts to do this by initiating a wire transfer via SMS message from compromised devices.(Citation: Securelist Asacub)

Executive priority

S0540: Asacub is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0540: Asacub by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0540: Asacub appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Asacub

Asacub is a banking trojan that attempts to steal money from victims’ bank accounts. It attempts to do this by initiating a wire transfer via SMS message from compromised devices.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

12 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1406Obfuscated Files or Information

Asacub has stored encrypted strings in the APK file.[1]

MobileT1426System Information Discovery

Asacub can collect various pieces of device information, including device model and OS version.[1]

MobileT1575Native API

Asacub has implemented functions in native code.[1]

MobileT1422System Network Configuration Discovery

Asacub can collect various pieces of device network configuration information, such as mobile network operator.[1]

MobileT1422.001Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique

Asacub can collect various pieces of device network configuration information, such as mobile network operator.[1]

MobileT1437.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Asacub has communicated with the C2 using HTTP POST requests.[1]

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

Asacub can collect the device’s contact list.[1]

MobileT1582SMS Control

Asacub can send SMS messages from compromised devices.[1]

MobileT1655.001Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique

Asacub has masqueraded as a client of popular free ads services.[1]

MobileT1532Archive Collected Data

Asacub has encrypted C2 communications using Base64-encoded RC4.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

Asacub can collect SMS messages as they are received.[1]

MobileT1626.001Device Administrator PermissionsSub-technique

Asacub can request device administrator permissions.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1406: Obfuscated Files or InformationMobileuses · TechniqueT1426: System Information DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1575: Native APIMobileuses · TechniqueT1422: System Network Configuration DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1422.001: Internet Connection DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1437.001: Web ProtocolsMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or LocationMobileuses · TechniqueT1532: Archive Collected DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1626.001: Device Administrator PermissionsMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
dc3333ba15284d4a...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundledc3333ba1528…
19.11.0Older bundledc3333ba1528…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Securelist Asacub

    T. Shishkova. (2018, August 28). The rise of mobile banker Asacub. Retrieved December 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Smaps

    (Citation: Securelist Asacub)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0540
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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