LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0422: Anubis

Anubis is Android malware that was originally used for cyber espionage, and has been retooled as a banking trojan.[1]

MobileS0422MalwareObject v1.3Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0422: Anubis describes [Anubis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0422) is Android malware that was originally used for cyber espionage, and has been retooled as a banking trojan.(Citation: Cofense Anubis)

Executive priority

S0422: Anubis is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0422: Anubis by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0422: Anubis appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Anubis

Anubis is Android malware that was originally used for cyber espionage, and has been retooled as a banking trojan.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

22 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1453Abuse Accessibility Features

After accessibility service is granted, Anubis lures the victim into changing the Accessibility settings on the device, disabling application removal, and executes screen taps and other commands without the victim’s knowledge.CitationCyble_Anubis_May2021

MobileT1533Data from Local System

Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage.[1]CitationTrend Micro Anubis

MobileT1532Archive Collected Data

Anubis exfiltrates data encrypted (with RC4) by its ransomware module.[1]

MobileT1424Process Discovery

Anubis can collect a list of running processes.CitationZimperium z9

MobileT1426System Information Discovery

Anubis can collect the device’s ID.[1]

MobileT1582SMS Control

Anubis can send, receive, and delete SMS messages.[1]

MobileT1633.001System ChecksSub-technique

Anubis has used motion sensor data to attempt to determine if it is running in an emulator.CitationTrend Micro Anubis

MobileT1616Call Control

Anubis can make phone calls.[1]

MobileT1418Software Discovery

Anubis can collect a list of installed applications to compare to a list of targeted applications.[1]

MobileT1417.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

Anubis can create overlays to capture user credentials for targeted applications.[1]

MobileT1629.003Disable or Modify ToolsSub-technique

Anubis can modify administrator settings and disable Play Protect.[1]

MobileT1471Data Encrypted for Impact

Anubis can use its ransomware module to encrypt device data and hold it for ransom.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

Anubis can retrieve the device’s GPS location.[1]

MobileT1655.001Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique

Anubis has requested accessibility service privileges while masquerading as "Google Play Protect" and has disguised additional malicious application installs as legitimate system updates.[1]CitationTrend Micro Anubis

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

Anubis can steal the device’s contact list.[1]

MobileT1513Screen Capture

Anubis can take screenshots.[1]

MobileT1476Deliver Malicious Application via Other Means

Anubis has been distributed via a phishing link in an email.[1]

MobileT1629.001Prevent Application RemovalSub-technique

Anubis may prevent malware's uninstallation by abusing Android’s ` performGlobalAction(int)` API call.

MobileT1407Download New Code at Runtime

Anubis can download attacker-specified APK files.CitationTrend Micro Anubis

MobileT1417.001KeyloggingSub-technique

Anubis has a keylogger that works in every application installed on the device.[1]

MobileT1481.001Dead Drop ResolverSub-technique

Anubis can retrieve the C2 address from Twitter and Telegram.[1]CitationTrend Micro Anubis

MobileT1429Audio Capture

Anubis can record phone calls and audio.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1453: Abuse Accessibility FeaturesMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1532: Archive Collected DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1424: Process DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1426: System Information DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1633.001: System ChecksMobileuses · TechniqueT1616: Call ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1418: Software DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.002: GUI Input CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1629.003: Disable or Modify ToolsMobileuses · TechniqueT1471: Data Encrypted for ImpactMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or LocationMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1513: Screen CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1476: Deliver Malicious Application via Other MeansMobileuses · TechniqueT1629.001: Prevent Application RemovalMobileuses · TechniqueT1407: Download New Code at RuntimeMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.001: KeyloggingMobileuses · TechniqueT1481.001: Dead Drop ResolverMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
c9070fac614d4385...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.3Current bundlec9070fac614d…
19.21.3Older bundle202fcad2d23c…
19.11.3Older bundle202fcad2d23c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Cofense Anubis

    M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved September 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0422
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use