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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0328: Stealth Mango

Stealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer. [1]

MobileS0328MalwareObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0328: Stealth Mango describes [Stealth Mango](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0328) is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as [Tangelo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0329) is believed to be from the same developer. (Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)

Executive priority

S0328: Stealth Mango is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0328: Stealth Mango by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0328: Stealth Mango appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Stealth Mango

Stealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1512Video Capture

Stealth Mango can record and take pictures using the front and back cameras.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

Stealth Mango can record audio using the device microphone.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

Stealth Mango uploads call logs.[1]

MobileT1582SMS Control

Stealth Mango deletes incoming SMS messages from specified numbers, including those that contain particular strings.[1]

MobileT1644Out of Band Data

Stealth Mango uses commands received from text messages for C2.[1]

MobileT1636.001Calendar EntriesSub-technique

Stealth Mango uploads calendar events and reminders.[1]

MobileT1474.003Compromise Software Supply ChainSub-technique

In at least one case, Stealth Mango may have been installed using physical access to the device by a repair shop.[1]

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

Stealth Mango uploads contact lists for various third-party applications such as Yahoo, AIM, GoogleTalk, Skype, QQ, and others.[1]

MobileT1422System Network Configuration Discovery

Stealth Mango collects and uploads information about changes in SIM card or phone numbers on the device.[1]

MobileT1418Software Discovery

Stealth Mango uploads information about installed packages.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

Stealth Mango can perform GPS location tracking as well as capturing coordinates as when an SMS message or call is received.[1]

MobileT1456Drive-By Compromise

Stealth Mango is delivered via a a watering hole website that mimics the third-party Android app store APKMonk. In at least one case, the watering hole URL was distributed through Facebook Messenger.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

Stealth Mango collected and exfiltrated data from the device, including sensitive letters/documents, stored photos, and stored audio files.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

Stealth Mango uploads SMS messages.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1644: Out of Band DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.001: Calendar EntriesMobileuses · TechniqueT1474.003: Compromise Software Supply ChainMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1422: System Network Configuration DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1418: Software DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1456: Drive-By CompromiseMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
c731e1949b6bf14e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundlec731e1949b6b…
19.11.3Older bundlec731e1949b6b…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lookout-StealthMango

    Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Stealth Mango

    (Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0328
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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