S0329: Tangelo
Tangelo is iOS malware that is believed to be from the same developers as the Stealth Mango Android malware. It is not a mobile application, but rather a Debian package that can only run on jailbroken iOS devices. [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
Tangelo matters because it represents iOS malware intended for jailbroken devices, where normal iOS security boundaries are weakened. The ATT&CK relationships point to collection-heavy behavior: stored app data, local files, call logs, SMS messages, audio, location, and network configuration details. For leaders, the practical issue is not broad iOS malware coverage in general, but whether the organization can identify jailbroken or non-compliant mobile devices before they become a source of sensitive data loss, privacy exposure, or incident uncertainty.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as a mobile device governance and sensitive-data exposure problem. The supplied ATT&CK data ties Tangelo to iOS and to behaviors that can expose communications, location, application data, and local system data. Executives should ask whether corporate access from jailbroken iOS devices is blocked or strongly controlled, whether mobile compliance evidence is available for audits, and whether incident response can quickly determine what mobile data may have been exposed if a device is compromised.
Technical view
Tangelo is described as a Debian package, not a normal mobile application, and can only run on jailbroken iOS devices. SOC, IR, and mobile security teams should validate controls and telemetry around jailbreak detection, unauthorized package presence, abnormal access to local application data, call/SMS stores, microphone use, location access, and discovery of device network configuration. ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object, so detection engineering should be based on the related techniques and local mobile management visibility rather than a claimed signature-level analytic.
Likely telemetry
- Mobile device management or enterprise mobility management compliance state, especially jailbreak status
- Inventory or forensic evidence of Debian packages or non-standard software on iOS devices
- Mobile security alerts for jailbroken devices or suspicious local data access
- Device logs or forensic artifacts showing access to application data, local files, SMS data, call logs, microphone, or location data where available
- Network telemetry associated with managed mobile devices, including device IP information and unusual communications from non-compliant devices
Detection direction
- Validate that jailbroken iOS devices are detected, reported, and either blocked or escalated according to policy.
- Because MITRE provides no official detection guidance for Tangelo, map detections to the related behaviors: Stored Application Data, System Network Configuration Discovery, Audio Capture, Location Tracking, Data from Local System, Call Log, and SMS Messages.
- Tune triage to distinguish legitimate managed-device administration or user-approved mobile permissions from signs of jailbreak-enabled access to data that iOS normally protects.
- Check for blind spots where mobile devices access corporate email, messaging, identity, or cloud services but are not covered by MDM, mobile threat defense, or compliance enforcement.
- For incident response, preserve device state carefully; mobile telemetry may be sparse, and evidence may require forensic collection rather than standard endpoint logs.
Mitigation priorities
- Enforce mobile access policies that restrict or block jailbroken iOS devices from corporate resources.
- Maintain mobile device inventory and compliance reporting so security teams can identify non-compliant devices before an incident.
- Limit sensitive enterprise data stored locally on mobile devices where feasible, and require strong identity and conditional access controls for mobile access.
- Review application permission and data handling practices for enterprise mobile apps, especially around local storage, location, microphone, and messaging-related data.
- Prepare mobile incident response procedures that include evidence collection, user communication, and decisions about credential reset or data exposure review when a jailbroken device is involved.
Additional notes and limits
The most decision-relevant fact is that Tangelo is not described as a standard iOS app; it is a Debian package for jailbroken iOS devices. That makes jailbreak governance, conditional access, and mobile forensic readiness more important than conventional app-store allowlisting alone. The relationship set indicates collection and discovery behaviors that could affect privacy, communications confidentiality, and business-sensitive data on the device.
This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK fields and relationships. ATT&CK lists no tactics and provides no official detection text for Tangelo. The source description says it is believed to be from the same developers as Stealth Mango, but this summary does not infer attribution or active exploitation. Local environment evidence is required to determine exposure, detection coverage, or whether any specific device is affected.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Tangelo
Tangelo is iOS malware that is believed to be from the same developers as the Stealth Mango Android malware. It is not a mobile application, but rather a Debian package that can only run on jailbroken iOS devices. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | |
| Mobile | T1422 | System Network Configuration Discovery | |
| Mobile | T1636.002 | Call LogSub-technique | |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | |
| Mobile | T1409 | Stored Application Data | |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | |
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 2e926b05b8d0… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]Tangelo
(Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)
- [4]Tangelo
(Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)
- [5]mitre-attackS0329Open source URL
- [6]mitre-attackS0329Open source URL
- [7]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [8]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [9]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [10]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [11]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [12]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL - [13]Lookout-StealthMango
Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
Open source URL
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