S1062: S.O.V.A.

S.O.V.A. is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. S.O.V.A., which is Russian for "owl", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.[1][2]

MobileS1062MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedApr 16, 2025, 21:22 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S1062: S.O.V.A. describes [S.O.V.A.](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062) is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. [S.O.V.A.](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062), which is Russian for "owl", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.(Citation: threatfabric_sova_0921)(Citation: cleafy_sova_1122)

Executive priority

S1062: S.O.V.A. is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1062: S.O.V.A. by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

Validate whether S1062: S.O.V.A. appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

S.O.V.A.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques19 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Mobile	T1418	Software Discovery	S.O.V.A. can search for installed applications that match a list of targets.[2]
Mobile	T1516	Input Injection	S.O.V.A. can programmatically tap the screen or swipe.[2]
Mobile	T1417.002	GUI Input CaptureSub-technique	S.O.V.A. can use overlays capture banking credentials and credit card information, and can open arbitrary WebViews from the C2.[1]
Mobile	T1636.004	SMS MessagesSub-technique	S.O.V.A. can intercept and read SMS messages.[1]
Mobile	T1409	Stored Application Data	S.O.V.A. can gather session cookies from infected devices. S.O.V.A. can also abuse Accessibility Services to steal Google Authenticator tokens.[1][2]
Mobile	T1513	Screen Capture	S.O.V.A. can take screenshots and abuse the Android Screen Cast feature to capture screen data.[2]
Mobile	T1464	Network Denial of Service	S.O.V.A. has C2 commands to add an infected device to a DDoS pool.[1]
Mobile	T1630.001	Uninstall Malicious ApplicationSub-technique	S.O.V.A. can uninstall itself.[1]
Mobile	T1417.001	KeyloggingSub-technique	S.O.V.A. can use keylogging to capture user input.[1]
Mobile	T1628.001	Suppress Application IconSub-technique	S.O.V.A. can hide its application icon.[1]
Mobile	T1426	System Information Discovery	S.O.V.A. can gather data about the device.[1]
Mobile	T1517	Access Notifications	S.O.V.A. can silently intercept and manipulate notifications. S.O.V.A. can also inject cookies via push notifications.[1]
Mobile	T1406.002	Software PackingSub-technique	S.O.V.A. has been distributed in obfuscated and packed form.[1]
Mobile	T1641.001	Transmitted Data ManipulationSub-technique	S.O.V.A. can manipulate clipboard data to replace cryptocurrency addresses.[1]
Mobile	T1471	Data Encrypted for Impact	S.O.V.A. has code to encrypt device data with AES.[2]
Mobile	T1582	SMS Control	S.O.V.A. can send SMS messages.[1]
Mobile	T1629.001	Prevent Application RemovalSub-technique	S.O.V.A. can resist removal by going to the home screen during uninstall.[1]
Mobile	T1437.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	S.O.V.A. can use the open-source project RetroFit for C2 communication.[1]
Mobile	T1638	Adversary-in-the-Middle	S.O.V.A. has included adversary-in-the-middle capabilities.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Feb 6, 2023, 19:34 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 16, 2025, 21:22 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: a4142bab43ad4245...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 21:22 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`a4142bab43ad…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 21:22 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`a4142bab43ad…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
threatfabric_sova_0921
ThreatFabric. (2021, September 9). S.O.V.A. - A new Android Banking trojan with fowl intentions. Retrieved February 6, 2023.
Open source URL
[2]
cleafy_sova_1122
Francesco Lubatti, Federico Valentini. (2022, November 8). SOVA malware is back and is evolving rapidly. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
Open source URL
[3]
mitre-attackS1062
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use