S0411: Rotexy

Rotexy is an Android banking malware that has evolved over several years. It was originally an SMS spyware Trojan first spotted in October 2014, and since then has evolved to contain more features, including ransomware functionality.[1]

MobileS0411MalwareObject v1.1ModifiedApr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0411: Rotexy describes [Rotexy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0411) is an Android banking malware that has evolved over several years. It was originally an SMS spyware Trojan first spotted in October 2014, and since then has evolved to contain more features, including ransomware functionality.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018)

Executive priority

S0411: Rotexy is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0411: Rotexy by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

Validate whether S0411: Rotexy appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Rotexy

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques16 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Mobile	T1636.003	Contact ListSub-technique	Rotexy can access and upload the contacts list to the command and control server.[1]
Mobile	T1644	Out of Band Data	Rotexy can be controlled through SMS messages.[1]
Mobile	T1633.001	System ChecksSub-technique	Rotexy checks if it is running in an analysis environment.[1]
Mobile	T1637.001	Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique	Rotexy procedurally generates subdomains for command and control communication.[1]
Mobile	T1437.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Rotexy can communicate with the command and control server using JSON payloads sent in HTTP POST request bodies. It can also communicate by using JSON messages sent through Google Cloud Messaging.[1]
Mobile	T1418	Software Discovery	Rotexy retrieves a list of installed applications and sends it to the command and control server.[1]
Mobile	T1628.001	Suppress Application IconSub-technique	Rotexy hides its icon after first launch.[1]
Mobile	T1424	Process Discovery	Rotexy collects information about running processes.[1]
Mobile	T1417.002	GUI Input CaptureSub-technique	Rotexy can use phishing overlays to capture users' credit card information.[1]
Mobile	T1406	Obfuscated Files or Information	Starting in 2017, the Rotexy DEX file was packed with garbage strings and/or operations.[1]
Mobile	T1636.004	SMS MessagesSub-technique	Rotexy processes incoming SMS messages by filtering based on phone numbers, keywords, and regular expressions, focusing primarily on banks, payment systems, and mobile network operators. Rotexy can also send a list of all SMS messages on the device to the command and control server.[1]
Mobile	T1422	System Network Configuration Discovery	Rotexy collects the device's IMEI and sends it to the command and control server.[1]
Mobile	T1582	SMS Control	Rotexy can automatically reply to SMS messages, and optionally delete them.[1]
Mobile	T1629.002	Device LockoutSub-technique	Rotexy can lock an HTML page in the foreground, requiring the user enter credit card information that matches information previously intercepted in SMS messages, such as the last 4 digits of a credit card number. If attempts to revoke administrator permissions are detected, Rotexy periodically switches off the phone screen to inhibit permission removal.[1]
Mobile	T1426	System Information Discovery	Rotexy collects information about the compromised device, including phone number, network operator, OS version, device model, and the device registration country.[1]
Mobile	T1521.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	Rotexy encrypts JSON HTTP payloads with AES.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.1
Created: Sep 23, 2019, 13:36 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: d1f8bf76b9c29731...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`d1f8bf76b9c2…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`d1f8bf76b9c2…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
securelist rotexy 2018
T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0411
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use