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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1055: SharkBot

SharkBot is a banking malware, first discovered in October 2021, that tries to initiate money transfers directly from compromised devices by abusing Accessibility Services.[1]

MobileS1055MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1055: SharkBot describes [SharkBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1055) is a banking malware, first discovered in October 2021, that tries to initiate money transfers directly from compromised devices by abusing Accessibility Services.(Citation: nccgroup_sharkbot_0322)

Executive priority

S1055: SharkBot is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1055: SharkBot by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1055: SharkBot appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SharkBot

SharkBot is a banking malware, first discovered in October 2021, that tries to initiate money transfers directly from compromised devices by abusing Accessibility Services.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1407Download New Code at Runtime

SharkBot can use the Android “Direct Reply” feature to spread the malware to other devices. It can also download the full version of the malware after initial device compromise.[1]

MobileT1644Out of Band Data

SharkBot can use the “Direct Reply” feature of Android to automatically reply to notifications with a message provided by C2.[1]

MobileT1646Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

SharkBot can exfiltrate captured user credentials and event logs back to the C2 server. [1]

MobileT1424Process Discovery

SharkBot can use Accessibility Services to detect which process is in the foreground.[1]

MobileT1417.001KeyloggingSub-technique

SharkBot can use accessibility event logging to steal data in text fields.[1]

MobileT1637.001Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique

SharkBot contains domain generation algorithms to use as backups in case the hardcoded C2 domains are unavailable.[1]

MobileT1630.001Uninstall Malicious ApplicationSub-technique

SharkBot has C2 commands that can uninstall the app from the infected device.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

SharkBot can intercept SMS messages.[1]

MobileT1516Input Injection

SharkBot can use input injection via Accessibility Services to simulate user touch inputs, prevent applications from opening, change device settings, and bypass MFA protections.[1]

MobileT1661Application Versioning

SharkBot initially poses as a benign application, then malware is downloaded and executed after an application update.[1]

MobileT1582SMS Control

SharkBot can hide and send SMS messages. SharkBot can also change which application is the device’s default SMS handler.[1]

MobileT1544Ingress Tool Transfer

SharkBot can download attacker-specified files.[1]

MobileT1406Obfuscated Files or Information

SharkBot can use a Domain Generation Algorithm to decode the C2 server location.[1]

MobileT1417.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

SharkBot can use a WebView with a fake log in site to capture banking credentials.[1]

MobileT1521.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

SharkBot has used RSA to encrypt the symmetric encryption key used for C2 messages.[1]

MobileT1437.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

SharkBot can use HTTP to send C2 messages to infected devices.[1]

MobileT1521.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

SharkBot can use RC4 to encrypt C2 payloads.[1]

MobileT1517Access Notifications

SharkBot can intercept notifications to send to the C2 server and take advantage of the Direct Reply feature.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1407: Download New Code at RuntimeMobileuses · TechniqueT1644: Out of Band DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1646: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelMobileuses · TechniqueT1424: Process DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.001: KeyloggingMobileuses · TechniqueT1637.001: Domain Generation AlgorithmsMobileuses · TechniqueT1630.001: Uninstall Malicious ApplicationMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1516: Input InjectionMobileuses · TechniqueT1661: Application VersioningMobileuses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1544: Ingress Tool TransferMobileuses · TechniqueT1406: Obfuscated Files or InformationMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.002: GUI Input CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1521.002: Asymmetric CryptographyMobileuses · TechniqueT1437.001: Web ProtocolsMobileuses · TechniqueT1521.001: Symmetric CryptographyMobileuses · TechniqueT1517: Access NotificationsMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3c40c484485fbd40...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle3c40c484485f…
19.11.0Older bundle3c40c484485f…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    nccgroup_sharkbot_0322

    RIFT: Research and Intelligence Fusion Team. (2022, March 3). SharkBot: a “new” generation Android banking Trojan being distributed on Google Play Store. Retrieved January 18, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1055
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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