S0427: TrickMo

TrickMo a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by TrickBot. TrickMo has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.[1]

TrickMo is designed to steal transaction authorization numbers (TANs), which are typically used as one-time passwords.[1]

MobileS0427MalwareObject v1.1ModifiedApr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0427: TrickMo describes [TrickMo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0427) a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266). [TrickMo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0427) has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.(Citation: SecurityIntelligence TrickMo) [TrickMo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0427) is designed to steal transaction authorization numbers (TANs), which are typically used as one-time passwords.(Citation: SecurityIntelligence TrickMo)

Executive priority

S0427: TrickMo is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0427: TrickMo by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

Validate whether S0427: TrickMo appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

TrickMo

TrickMo a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by TrickBot. TrickMo has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.[1]

TrickMo is designed to steal transaction authorization numbers (TANs), which are typically used as one-time passwords.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques17 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Mobile	T1624.001	Broadcast ReceiversSub-technique	TrickMo registers for the `SCREEN_ON` and `SMS_DELIVER` intents to perform actions when the device is unlocked and when the device receives an SMS message.[1]
Mobile	T1422.001	Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique	TrickMo can collect device network configuration information such as IMSI, IMEI, and Wi-Fi connection state.[1]
Mobile	T1422	System Network Configuration Discovery	TrickMo can collect device network configuration information such as IMSI, IMEI, and Wi-Fi connection state.[1]
Mobile	T1629.002	Device LockoutSub-technique	TrickMo can prevent the user from interacting with the UI by showing a WebView with a persistent cursor.[1]
Mobile	T1437.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	TrickMo communicates with the C2 by sending JSON objects over unencrypted HTTP requests.[1]
Mobile	T1422.002	Wi-Fi DiscoverySub-technique	TrickMo can collect device network configuration information such as IMSI, IMEI, and Wi-Fi connection state.[1]
Mobile	T1636.004	SMS MessagesSub-technique	TrickMo can intercept SMS messages.[1]
Mobile	T1418	Software Discovery	TrickMo can collect a list of installed applications.[1]
Mobile	T1630.001	Uninstall Malicious ApplicationSub-technique	TrickMo can uninstall itself from a device on command by abusing the accessibility service.[1]
Mobile	T1516	Input Injection	TrickMo can inject input to set itself as the default SMS handler, and to automatically click through pop-ups without giving the user any time to react.[1]
Mobile	T1644	Out of Band Data	TrickMo can be controlled via encrypted SMS message.[1]
Mobile	T1426	System Information Discovery	TrickMo can collect device information such as network operator, model, brand, and OS version.[1]
Mobile	T1513	Screen Capture	TrickMo can use the `MediaRecorder` class to record the screen when the targeted application is presented to the user, and can abuse accessibility features to record targeted applications to intercept transaction authorization numbers (TANs) and to scrape on-screen text.[1]
Mobile	T1582	SMS Control	TrickMo can delete SMS messages.[1]
Mobile	T1533	Data from Local System	TrickMo can steal pictures from the device.[1]
Mobile	T1633.001	System ChecksSub-technique	TrickMo can detect if it is running on a rooted device or an emulator.[1]
Mobile	T1406	Obfuscated Files or Information	TrickMo contains obfuscated function, class, and variable names, and encrypts its shared preferences using Java’s `PBEWithMD5AndDES` algorithm.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.1
Created: Apr 24, 2020, 17:46 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: d8d3382bf9f37cc8...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`d8d3382bf9f3…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`d8d3382bf9f3…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
SecurityIntelligence TrickMo
P. Asinovsky. (2020, March 24). TrickBot Pushing a 2FA Bypass App to Bank Customers in Germany. Retrieved April 24, 2020.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0427
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use