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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0485: Mandrake

Mandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.

Mandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.[1]

MobileS0485MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0485: Mandrake describes [Mandrake](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485) is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. [Mandrake](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485) is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision. [Mandrake](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485) has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is ...

Executive priority

S0485: Mandrake is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0485: Mandrake by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0485: Mandrake appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Mandrake

Mandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.

Mandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

25 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1655.001Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique

Mandrake can mimic an app called “Storage Settings” if it cannot hide its icon.[1]

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

Mandrake can access the device’s contact list.[1]

MobileT1633.001System ChecksSub-technique

Mandrake can evade automated analysis environments by requiring a CAPTCHA on launch that will prevent the application from running if not passed. It also checks for indications that it is running in an emulator.[1]

MobileT1517Access Notifications

Mandrake can capture all device notifications and hide notifications from the user.[1]

MobileT1541Foreground Persistence

Mandrake uses foreground persistence to keep a service running. It shows the user a transparent notification to evade detection.[1]

MobileT1409Stored Application Data

Mandrake can collect all accounts stored on the device.[1]

MobileT1509Non-Standard Port

Mandrake has communicated with the C2 server over TCP port 7777.[1]

MobileT1582SMS Control

Mandrake can block, forward, hide, and send SMS messages.[1]

MobileT1513Screen Capture

Mandrake can record the screen.[1]

MobileT1629.003Disable or Modify ToolsSub-technique

Mandrake can disable Play Protect.[1]

MobileT1406Obfuscated Files or Information

Mandrake obfuscates its hardcoded C2 URLs.[1]

MobileT1629.001Prevent Application RemovalSub-technique

Mandrake can abuse device administrator permissions to ensure that it cannot be uninstalled until its permissions are revoked.[1]

MobileT1481.002Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique

Mandrake has used Firebase for C2.[1]

MobileT1516Input Injection

Mandrake abuses the accessibility service to prevent removing administrator permissions, accessibility permissions, and to set itself as the default SMS handler.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

Mandrake can collect the device’s location.[1]

MobileT1418Software Discovery

Mandrake can obtain a list of installed applications.[1]

MobileT1417.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

Mandrake can manipulate visual components to trick the user into granting dangerous permissions, and can use phishing overlays and JavaScript injection to capture credentials.[1]

MobileT1632.001Code Signing Policy ModificationSub-technique

Mandrake can enable app installation from unknown sources.[1]

MobileT1628.001Suppress Application IconSub-technique

Mandrake can hide its icon on older Android versions.[1]

MobileT1407Download New Code at Runtime

Mandrake can download its second (Loader) and third (Core) stages after the dropper is installed.[1]

MobileT1637.001Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique

Mandrake has used domain generation algorithms.[1]

MobileT1630.002File DeletionSub-technique

Mandrake can delete all data from an infected device.[1]

MobileT1426System Information Discovery

Mandrake can access device configuration information and status, including Android version, battery level, device model, country, and SIM operator.[1]

MobileT1544Ingress Tool Transfer

Mandrake can install attacker-specified components or applications.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

Mandrake can access SMS messages.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3d04d93f433b045e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle3d04d93f433b…
19.11.0Older bundle3d04d93f433b…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Bitdefender Mandrake

    R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    briar

    (Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)

  3. [3]
    darkmatter

    (Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0485
    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    oxide

    (Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)

  6. [6]
    ricinus

    (Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.