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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0577: FrozenCell

FrozenCell is the mobile component of a family of surveillanceware, with a corresponding desktop component known as KasperAgent and Micropsia.[1]

There are multiple close variants of FrozenCell, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], Desert Scorpion and SpyC23, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.

MobileS0577MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0577: FrozenCell describes [FrozenCell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0577) is the mobile component of a family of surveillanceware, with a corresponding desktop component known as KasperAgent and [Micropsia](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0339).(Citation: Lookout FrozenCell) There are multiple close variants of [FrozenCell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0577), such as VAMP(Citation: Unit42 VAMP 2017), GnatSpy(Citation: Trendmicro GnatSpy 2017), [Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505) and [SpyC23](https://att...

Executive priority

S0577: FrozenCell is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0577: FrozenCell by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0577: FrozenCell appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

FrozenCell

FrozenCell is the mobile component of a family of surveillanceware, with a corresponding desktop component known as KasperAgent and Micropsia.[1]

There are multiple close variants of FrozenCell, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], Desert Scorpion and SpyC23, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1430Location Tracking

FrozenCell has used an online cell tower geolocation service to track targets.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

FrozenCell has retrieved device images for exfiltration.[1]

MobileT1407Download New Code at Runtime

FrozenCell has downloaded and installed additional applications.[1]

MobileT1422System Network Configuration Discovery

FrozenCell has collected phone metadata such as cell location, mobile country code (MCC), and mobile network code (MNC).[1]

MobileT1420File and Directory Discovery

FrozenCell has searched for pdf, doc, docx, ppt, pptx, xls, and xlsx file types for exfiltration.[1]

MobileT1655.001Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique

FrozenCell has masqueraded as fake updates to chat applications such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Messenger, LINE, and LoveChat, as well as apps targeting Middle Eastern demographics.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

FrozenCell has read SMS messages for exfiltration.[1]

MobileT1409Stored Application Data

FrozenCell has retrieved account information for other applications.[1]

MobileT1426System Information Discovery

FrozenCell has gathered the device manufacturer, model, and serial number.[1]

MobileT1532Archive Collected Data

FrozenCell has compressed and encrypted data before exfiltration using password protected .7z archives.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

FrozenCell has recorded calls.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupMobile

G1028: APT-C-23

APT-C-23 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[1] APT-C-23 has primarily focused its operations on the Middle East, including Israeli military assets. APT-C-23 has developed mobile spyware targeting Android and iOS devices since 2017.[2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d7af6d72b784bdb4...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundled7af6d72b784…
19.11.1Older bundled7af6d72b784…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lookout FrozenCell

    Michael Flossman. (2017, October 5). FrozenCell: Multi-platform surveillance campaign against Palestinians. Retrieved November 11, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Unit42 VAMP 2017

    Bar, T., Lancaster, T. (2017, April 5). Targeted Attacks in the Middle East Using KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA. Retrieved March 4, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Trendmicro GnatSpy 2017

    Guo, G., Xu, E. (2017, December 18). New GnatSpy Mobile Malware Family Discovered. Retrieved March 4, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0577
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.