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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1095: AhRat

AhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, “iRecorder – Screen Recorder,” which itself was released in September 2021.[1]

MobileS1095MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1095: AhRat describes [AhRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1095) is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. [AhRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1095) initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, “iRecorder – Screen Recorder,” which itself was released in September 2021.(Citation: welivesecurity_ahrat_0523)

Executive priority

S1095: AhRat is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1095: AhRat by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1095: AhRat appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

AhRat

AhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, “iRecorder – Screen Recorder,” which itself was released in September 2021.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1437.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

AhRat can communicate with the C2 using HTTPS requests.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

AhRat can find and exfiltrate files with certain extensions, such as .jpg, .mp4, .html, .docx, and .pdf.[1]

MobileT1646Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

AhRat can exfiltrate collected data to the C2, such as audio recordings and files.[1]

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

AhRat can collect the device’s contact list.[1]

MobileT1398Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

AhRat can register with the `BOOT_COMPLETED` broadcast to start when the device turns on.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

AhRat can track the device’s location.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

AhRat can collect the device’s call log.[1]

MobileT1406Obfuscated Files or Information

AhRat can use an encryption key received from its C2 to encrypt and decrypt configuration files and exfiltrated data.[1]

MobileT1420File and Directory Discovery

AhRat can enumerate files on external storage.[1]

MobileT1521Encrypted Channel

AhRat can communicate with the C2 using HTTPS requests.[1]

MobileT1513Screen Capture

AhRat can record the screen.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

AhRat can record audio using a device’s microphone.[1]

MobileT1426System Information Discovery

AhRat can obtain device info such as manufacturer, device ID, OS version, and country.[1]

MobileT1624.001Broadcast ReceiversSub-technique

AhRat can register with the `CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE` and `WIFI_STATE_CHANGED` broadcast events to trigger further functionality.[1]

MobileT1582SMS Control

AhRat can send SMS messages.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1437.001: Web ProtocolsMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1646: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1398: Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1406: Obfuscated Files or InformationMobileuses · TechniqueT1420: File and Directory DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1521: Encrypted ChannelMobileuses · TechniqueT1513: Screen CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1426: System Information DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1624.001: Broadcast ReceiversMobileuses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4ab251d784127561...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle4ab251d78412…
19.11.0Older bundle4ab251d78412…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    welivesecurity_ahrat_0523

    Lukas Stefanko. (2023, May 23). Android app breaking bad: From legitimate screen recording to file exfiltration within a year. Retrieved December 18, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1095
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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