S1069: TangleBot
MITRE ATT&CK S1069: TangleBot Malware details for Android, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
S1069: TangleBot describes [TangleBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1069) is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. [TangleBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1069) has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to [FluBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1067) Android malware campaigns.(Citation: cloudmark_tanglebot_0921)
Executive priority
S1069: TangleBot is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1069: TangleBot by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1069: TangleBot appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
TangleBot
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | This object uses Software Discovery. |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | This object uses Location Tracking. |
| Mobile | T1512 | Video Capture | This object uses Video Capture. |
| Mobile | T1636.003 | Contact ListSub-technique | This object uses Contact List. |
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System | This object uses Data from Local System. |
| Mobile | T1616 | Call Control | This object uses Call Control. |
| Mobile | T1417.002 | GUI Input CaptureSub-technique | This object uses GUI Input Capture. |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | This object uses Audio Capture. |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | This object uses SMS Messages. |
| Mobile | T1513 | Screen Capture | This object uses Screen Capture. |
| Mobile | T1582 | SMS Control | This object uses SMS Control. |
| Mobile | T1636.002 | Call LogSub-technique | This object uses Call Log. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 70cc51e13d22… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 70cc51e13d22… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 70cc51e13d22… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]cloudmark_tanglebot_0921
Felipe Naves, Andrew Conway, W. Stuart Jones, Adam McNeil . (2021, September 23). TangleBot: New Advanced SMS Malware Targets Mobile Users Across U.S. and Canada with COVID-19 Lures. Retrieved February 28, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1069Open source URL
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