S0551: GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0551: GoldenEagle describes [GoldenEagle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0551) is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)
Executive priority
S0551: GoldenEagle is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0551: GoldenEagle by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0551: GoldenEagle appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1646 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | GoldenEagle has exfiltrated data via both SMTP and HTTP.[1] |
| Mobile | T1420 | File and Directory Discovery | GoldenEagle has looked for .doc, .txt, .gif, .apk, .jpg, .png, .mp3, and .db files on external storage.[1] |
| Mobile | T1632.001 | Code Signing Policy ModificationSub-technique | GoldenEagle has modified or configured proxy information.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.003 | Contact ListSub-technique | GoldenEagle has collected a list of contacts.[1] |
| Mobile | T1437.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | GoldenEagle has used HTTP POST requests for C2.[1] |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | GoldenEagle has tracked location.[1] |
| Mobile | T1655.001 | Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique | GoldenEagle has inserted trojan functionality into legitimate apps, including popular apps within the Uyghur community, VPNs, instant messaging apps, social networking, games, adult media, and Google searching.[1] |
| Mobile | T1582 | SMS Control | GoldenEagle has sent messages to an attacker-controlled number.[1] |
| Mobile | T1512 | Video Capture | GoldenEagle has taken photos with the device camera.[1] |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | GoldenEagle has recorded calls and environment audio in .amr format.[1] |
| Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime | GoldenEagle can download new code to update itself.[1] |
| Mobile | T1426 | System Information Discovery | GoldenEagle has checked for system root.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | GoldenEagle has collected SMS messages.[1] |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | GoldenEagle has collected a list of installed application names.[1] |
| Mobile | T1513 | Screen Capture | GoldenEagle has taken screenshots.[1] |
| Mobile | T1409 | Stored Application Data | GoldenEagle has extracted messages from chat programs, such as WeChat.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.002 | Call LogSub-technique | GoldenEagle has collected call logs.[1] |
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System | GoldenEagle has retrieved .doc, .txt, .gif, .apk, .jpg, .png, .mp3, and .db files from external storage.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | d19b3e64416b… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d19b3e64416b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Lookout Uyghur Campaign
A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0551Open source URL
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