T1512: Video Capture
An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Malware or scripts may interact with the device cameras through an available API provided by the operating system. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of the device’s cameras for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen.
In Android, an application must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the cameras. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file. In both cases, the user must grant permission to the requesting application to use the camera. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, an adversary may be able to access the camera without knowledge of the user.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1512: Video Capture describes An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. Malware or scripts may interact with the device cameras through an available API provided by the operating system. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513) due to use of the device’s cameras for video recording rather t...
Executive priority
T1512: Video Capture is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1512: Video Capture by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1512: Video Capture appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Video Capture
An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Malware or scripts may interact with the device cameras through an available API provided by the operating system. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of the device’s cameras for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen.
In Android, an application must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the cameras. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file. In both cases, the user must grant permission to the requesting application to use the camera. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, an adversary may be able to access the camera without knowledge of the user.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0112: Windshift
S0328: Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer. [1]
S0421: GolfSpy
GolfSpy is Android spyware deployed by the group Bouncing Golf.[1]
S9004: Crocodilus
Crocodilus is an Android banking Trojan that was discovered in March 2025. Crocodilus targeted users worldwide, including Turkey, Poland, Argentina, Brazil, Spain, the United States, Indonesia and India. Crocodilus has been customized based on the target location. For example, Crocodilus mimicked major Turkish and Spanish banks for users in Turkey and Spain, while users in Poland saw Facebook advertisements that promoted Crocodilus to claim bonus points.[1][2]
S1195: SpyC23
SpyC23 is a mobile malware that has been used by APT-C-23 since at least 2017. SpyC23 has been observed primarily targeting Android devices in the Middle East.[1]
There are multiple close variants of SpyC23, such as VAMP[2], GnatSpy[3], Desert Scorpion and FrozenCell, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.
S1069: TangleBot
TangleBot is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. TangleBot has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to FluBot Android malware campaigns.[1]
S0407: Monokle
S1092: Escobar
S1080: Fakecalls
S1243: DCHSpy
DCHSpy is an Android spyware likely used by MuddyWater. DCHSpy uses political decoys and masquerades as legitimate applications, such as VPNs and banking applications, to trick victims into downloading the malware. Once downloaded, DCHSpy collects information from the device and exfiltrates the data to the command and control (C2) server.[1]
S0489: WolfRAT
S0535: Golden Cup
Golden Cup is Android spyware that has been used to target World Cup fans.[1]
S0327: Skygofree
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 2.1 | Current bundle | 2b7fa939f33b… | ||
| 19.2 | 2.1 | Older bundle | 2b7fa939f33b… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.1 | Older bundle | 2b7fa939f33b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-19Open source URL
- [2]mitre-attackT1512Open source URL
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