S1061: AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. AbstractEmu was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1061: AbstractEmu describes [AbstractEmu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1061) is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. [AbstractEmu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1061) was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.(Citation: lookout_abstractemu_1021)
Executive priority
S1061: AbstractEmu is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1061: AbstractEmu by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1061: AbstractEmu appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. AbstractEmu was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1517 | Access Notifications | AbstractEmu can monitor notifications.[1] |
| Mobile | T1633.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | AbstractEmu can check device system properties to potentially avoid running while under analysis.[1] |
| Mobile | T1623.001 | Unix ShellSub-technique | AbstractEmu has included encoded shell scripts to potentially aid in the rooting process.[1] |
| Mobile | T1406 | Obfuscated Files or Information | AbstractEmu has encoded files, such as exploit binaries, to potentially use during and after the rooting process.[1] |
| Mobile | T1422.001 | Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique | AbstractEmu can collect device IP address and SIM information.[1] |
| Mobile | T1422 | System Network Configuration Discovery | AbstractEmu can collect device IP address and SIM information.[1] |
| Mobile | T1633 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | AbstractEmu has used code abstraction and anti-emulation checks to potentially avoid running while under analysis.[1] |
| Mobile | T1404 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | AbstractEmu can use rooting exploits to silently give itself permissions or install additional malware.[1] |
| Mobile | T1437.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | AbstractEmu can use HTTP to communicate with the C2 server.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | AbstractEmu can intercept SMS messages containing two factor authentication codes.[1] |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | AbstractEmu can grant itself microphone permissions.[1] |
| Mobile | T1646 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | AbstractEmu can send large amounts of device data over its C2 channel, including the device’s manufacturer, model, version and serial number, telephone number, and IP address.[1] |
| Mobile | T1629.003 | Disable or Modify ToolsSub-technique | AbstractEmu can disable Play Protect.[1] |
| Mobile | T1418 | Software Discovery | AbstractEmu can obtain a list of installed applications.[1] |
| Mobile | T1426 | System Information Discovery | AbstractEmu can collect device information such as manufacturer, model, version, serial number, and telephone number.[1] |
| Mobile | T1533 | Data from Local System | AbstractEmu can collect files from or inspect the device’s filesystem.[1] |
| Mobile | T1512 | Video Capture | AbstractEmu can grant itself camera permissions.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.002 | Call LogSub-technique | AbstractEmu can access device call logs.[1] |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | AbstractEmu can access a device's location.[1] |
| Mobile | T1626.001 | Device Administrator PermissionsSub-technique | AbstractEmu can modify system settings to give itself device administrator privileges.[1] |
| Mobile | T1544 | Ingress Tool Transfer | AbstractEmu can receive files from the C2 at runtime.[1] |
| Mobile | T1407 | Download New Code at Runtime | AbstractEmu can download and install additional malware after initial infection.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.003 | Contact ListSub-technique | AbstractEmu can grant itself contact list access.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 874bd5026736… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 874bd5026736… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]lookout_abstractemu_1021
P Shunk, K Balaam. (2021, October 28). Rooting Malware Makes a Comeback: Lookout Discovers Global Campaign. Retrieved February 6, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1061Open source URL
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