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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0324: SpyDealer

SpyDealer is Android malware that exfiltrates sensitive data from Android devices. [1]

MobileS0324MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0324: SpyDealer describes [SpyDealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0324) is Android malware that exfiltrates sensitive data from Android devices. (Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)

Executive priority

S0324: SpyDealer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0324: SpyDealer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0324: SpyDealer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SpyDealer

SpyDealer is Android malware that exfiltrates sensitive data from Android devices. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1513Screen Capture

SpyDealer abuses Accessibility features to steal messages from popular apps such as WeChat, Skype, Viber, and QQ.[1]

MobileT1407Download New Code at Runtime

SpyDealer downloads and executes root exploits from a remote server.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

SpyDealer harvests phone call history from victims.[1]

MobileT1645Compromise Client Software Binary

SpyDealer maintains persistence by installing an Android application package (APK) on the system partition.[1]

MobileT1644Out of Band Data

SpyDealer enables remote control of the victim through SMS channels.[1]

MobileT1409Stored Application Data

SpyDealer exfiltrates data from over 40 apps such as WeChat, Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, and others.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

SpyDealer harvests location data from victims.[1]

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

SpyDealer harvests contact lists from victims.[1]

MobileT1404Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

SpyDealer uses the commercial rooting app Baidu Easy Root to gain root privilege and maintain persistence on the victim.[1]

MobileT1624.001Broadcast ReceiversSub-technique

SpyDealer registers the broadcast receiver to listen for events related to device boot-up.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

SpyDealer harvests SMS and MMS messages from victims.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

SpyDealer can record phone calls and surrounding audio.[1]

MobileT1422System Network Configuration Discovery

SpyDealer harvests the device phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.[1]

MobileT1512Video Capture

SpyDealer can record video and take photos via front and rear cameras.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1513: Screen CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1407: Download New Code at RuntimeMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1645: Compromise Client Software BinaryMobileuses · TechniqueT1644: Out of Band DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1409: Stored Application DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1404: Exploitation for Privilege EscalationMobileuses · TechniqueT1624.001: Broadcast ReceiversMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1422: System Network Configuration DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
69390208bfe1ab27...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle69390208bfe1…
19.11.2Older bundle69390208bfe1…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    PaloAlto-SpyDealer

    Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    SpyDealer

    (Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0324
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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