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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1077: Hornbill

Hornbill is one of two mobile malware families known to be used by the APT Confucius. Analysis suggests that Hornbill was first active in early 2018. While Hornbill and Sunbird overlap in core capabilities, Hornbill has tools and behaviors suggesting more passive reconnaissance.[1]

MobileS1077MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1077: Hornbill describes [Hornbill](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077) is one of two mobile malware families known to be used by the APT [Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142). Analysis suggests that [Hornbill](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077) was first active in early 2018. While [Hornbill](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077) and [Sunbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1082) overlap in core capabilities, [Hornbill](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077) has tools and behaviors suggesting more passive ...

Executive priority

S1077: Hornbill is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1077: Hornbill by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1077: Hornbill appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Hornbill

Hornbill is one of two mobile malware families known to be used by the APT Confucius. Analysis suggests that Hornbill was first active in early 2018. While Hornbill and Sunbird overlap in core capabilities, Hornbill has tools and behaviors suggesting more passive reconnaissance.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1422System Network Configuration Discovery

Hornbill can collect a device's phone number and IMEI, and can check to see if WiFi is enabled.[1]

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

Hornbill can collect device contacts.[1]

MobileT1630.002File DeletionSub-technique

Hornbill can delete locally gathered files after uploading them to the C2 to avoid suspicion.[1]

MobileT1628.002User EvasionSub-technique

Hornbill uses an infrequent data upload schedule to avoid user detection and battery drain. It also can delete on-device data after being sent to the C2, and stores collected data in hidden folders on external storage.[1]

MobileT1655.001Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique

Hornbill has impersonated chat applications such as Fruit Chat, Cucu Chat, and Kako Chat.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

Hornbill can record environmental and call audio.[1]

MobileT1437.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Hornbill can use HTTP and HTTP POST to communicate information to the C2.[1]

MobileT1426System Information Discovery

Hornbill can collect the device ID, model, manufacturer, and Android version. It can also check available storage space and if the screen is locked.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

Hornbill can access a device’s location and check if GPS is enabled. Hornbill has logic to only log location changes greater than 70 meters.[1]

MobileT1646Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Hornbill can exfiltrate data back to the C2 server using HTTP.[1]

MobileT1517Access Notifications

Hornbill has monitored for SMS and WhatsApp notifications.[1]

MobileT1420File and Directory Discovery

Hornbill has a list of file extensions that it may use to log certain operations (creation, open, close, modification, movement, deletion) on files of those types.[1]

MobileT1418Software Discovery

Hornbill can search for installed applications such as WhatsApp.[1]

MobileT1409Stored Application Data

Hornbill can collect voice notes and messages from WhatsApp, if installed.[1]

MobileT1513Screen Capture

Hornbill can take screenshots and can abuse accessibility services to scrape WhatsApp messages, contacts, and notifications.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

Hornbill can access images stored on external storage.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

Hornbill can gather device call logs.[1]

MobileT1422.001Internet Connection DiscoverySub-technique

Hornbill can collect a device's phone number and IMEI, and can check to see if WiFi is enabled.[1]

MobileT1626.001Device Administrator PermissionsSub-technique

Hornbill can request device administrator privileges.[1]

MobileT1422.002Wi-Fi DiscoverySub-technique

Hornbill can collect a device's phone number and IMEI, and can check to see if Wi-Fi is enabled.[1]

MobileT1512Video Capture

Hornbill can access a device’s camera and take photos.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupMobile

G0142: Confucius

Confucius is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between Confucius and Patchwork, particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0142: ConfuciusMobileuses · TechniqueT1422: System Network Configuration DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1630.002: File DeletionMobileuses · TechniqueT1628.002: User EvasionMobileuses · TechniqueT1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or LocationMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1437.001: Web ProtocolsMobileuses · TechniqueT1426: System Information DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1646: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelMobileuses · TechniqueT1517: Access NotificationsMobileuses · TechniqueT1420: File and Directory DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1418: Software DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1409: Stored Application DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1513: Screen CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1422.001: Internet Connection DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1626.001: Device Administrator PermissionsMobileuses · TechniqueT1422.002: Wi-Fi DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
da3a872bdef2896e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundleda3a872bdef2…
19.11.0Older bundleda3a872bdef2…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221

    Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1077
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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